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WORKS COUNCILS: A CASE STUDY
SYNOPSIS
The case study features an industrial relations problem in
1977/78 in an American-owned manufacturing company in
South-Eastorn England. There is a union recognition issue
which is tackled by mounting a major programme of OD
leading to the provis ion of a company c o n s t i t u t i o n
featuring a system of multi-level policy making councils.
The system was then monitored for six years.
In general, the predicted outcomes were realised however,
there were two unpredicted by-products of the programme.
- those involved in the or ig inal dispute (blue col lar
manufacturing employees) voluntarily withdrew from the
union despite there being provision for union involve-
ment in the Constitution
i t was found that the desire for a system of represen-
ta t ive par t ic ipa t ion was not universal among a l l
employees.
These findings - both the predicted and the unpredicted -
are discussed and interpreted.
It is the second unpredicted by-product - representat ive
participation's lack of universal appeal - which provides
the most important outcome from the standpoint of theory
development, on the place of constitutions in organization
d e s i g n . This l e a d s to the d e r i v a t i o n of l i m i t i n g
conditions for their application in Section 3.
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INTRODUCTION
In contemporary society considerable attention is being
paid to ways of improving the quality of working life. It
is becoming increasingly widely accepted that concern
should be shown not only for the material and economic
aspects of employment, but also for the effect of work upon
the well-being of individuals. Participation, in one form
or another, is seen as a means of improving the quality of
life. In countries such as West Germany, Yugoslavia,
Norway and Holland participation has been legislated for by
the introduction of formal systems of participation through
such bodies as Worker's Councils and supervisory boards
incorporating worker directors. The movement towards
greater employee involvement has as its background the
values of democracy. The principles that individuals have
equal political rights, government by the consent of the
majority, and people should be involved in decisions which
affect their Lives, are central to our culture.
On the other hand, economic performance is the specific
function and contribution of business enterprise. It needs
to get work done but work directed towards economic
performance, objectives and results - which may not align
well with the ideals of participation and democracy. A
company is an economic organism created over and above the
individuals who constitute it. This entity has a life
 of
its own which often exceeds in length that of its human
members. Further, it will always stress the corporate need
over that of any individual working for i t .
The field of worker participation is plentifully supplied
with ideas, ins t i tu t ions and opinions but i t is rather
short of hard evidence. There is a need to study the
responses of employees to participative systems which have
been designed and implemented to meet their expressed
desires. Questions of interest to be answered, cover both
the effects of the system upon employee at t i tudes and the
practical aspects of implementing and running the schemes.
The Company X case which follows provides useful evidence
about this kind of programme.
1.0 COMPANY X CASE
In August 1977 a firm of management consul tants and
tra iners , GIM Limited, was engaged by a manufacturing
company to examine, and if p o s s i b l e s o l v e , an
industrial relations problem they were experiencing.
I was appointed to lead the project team.
The Company (we wil l ca l l i t Company X) is a small
part of an American-based mul t i -na t iona l en te rpr i se
which employed at that time 30,000 people in 24
countries and is one of the world's leading producers
in i t s chosen field.
X is the world-wide scient i f ic division of the multi-
national with manufacturing f ac i l i t i e s in East Anglia,
Connecticut and Cal i fornia . The d iv is ion is s p l i t
into five geographical areas in Europe, North America,
Latin and South America, Middle East and Far East.
The European headquarters is in East Anglia and it is
this and the nearby manufacturing plant which provides
the focus of this case study.
At i t s headquarters there were 100 people engaged in
such things as admin i s t r a t ion , accounting, legal
se rv ices , data processing and sa l e s . The manufactu-
ring plant was located seven miles north with 200
people and there was a third s i te five miles south of
headquarters. The third s i te contained two dis t inc t
departments: Business Development with 50 people and
a machine shop also with 50 people. Business Develop-
ment was a multi-disciplinary department containing
market development, product development and manufactu-
ring development. Organizationally the machine shop
reported to the manufacturing operation.
1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR RELATIONS
The Company's P e r s o n n e l Manager b r i e f e d me on 6
September, 1977 in the fol lowing t e rms :
'A s u b s t a n t i a l number (70 i t i s c l a i m e d ) of b lue
co l l a r workers at the manufacturing s i t e have
joined TASS, the white collar section of AUEW and
have claimed r e c o g n i t i o n . When the Company
refused to recognise them (a, because they are not
representative of the workforce as a whole and b,
because a white co l l a r union is not competent to
represent blue co l l a r s t a f f ) , the Union members
took their claim to ACAS, who conducted an enquiry
and a b a l l o t . The r e s u l t is expected l a t e r th i s
month.
Another substantial number of employees, princi-
pal ly white c o l l a r , when faced with the ACAS
bal lot , decided that TASS was not the only a l t e r -
native to our present system and formed themselves
into a committee. I t is t h i s committee that the
Company now wishes to promote and use as a toun-
dat ion on which to build a new i n d u s t r i a l
relations s t ructure 1 .
I f i r s t v is i ted the company on 12 and 13 September
1977 and met the five members of the committee and the
Company's Personnel Manager. After a quite long
discussion with these people, exploration continued by
examining organization charts, touring the three sites
and in doing so meeting key members of staff, looking
at production processes, factors affecting status such
as canteens and company cars , and finding out about
such things as job evaluation and pay systems, the
power exerted by the American head office e tc . Much
general information was obtained but the following
seemed of particular relevance:
- Excepting those people who were unionized repre-
sentative roles did not exist in the Company.
Most of the employees in the machine shop had been
unionized for some time but were not active. They
were members of AUEW.*
That there was potent ia l division and confl ict
between pro and anti-union groups.
That the General Manager (chief executive) and
Business Development Manager (both Americans and
assigned to Company X on two to three year tours
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers.
from a Head Office pool of top executives) were of
a l i b e r a l d i s p o s i t i o n and human r e l a t i o n s
or iented. Both seemed very well trained and of
high capability.
That the Works Director (an Englishman inherited
from an e a r l i e r takeover) was of a more conser-
vative and au tocra t i c d i spos i t ion - very able
however.
That the Company had engaged GIM because of i t s
knowledge and experience of Glacier-type works
councils.
My overall impression of Company X was most favourable.
Further discussion with the committee revealed that
they thought that representa t ive ro les were now
inevi table in the Company, and if we l l - s t ruc tu red ,
they could be of use to the Company as a means of
obtaining feedback. I t was jo in t ly decided by the
Company's top management, the committee and me that
more d e t a i l e d informat ion was needed about the
s i t ua t i on as the workforce perceived i t and that GIM
Consultants should conduct a communication programme.
I decided that the form this should take would involve
meeting the entire workforce in small groups with the
aims of tracing the root causes of the problem being
experienced, and more accurately ascer ta ining the i r
needs with respect to communication and, represen-
t a t ion . In te rna l ly th i s programme was variously
called OD and "talk-in".
It was also agreed that , whilst th is was going on,
attendance should be offered to all employees at a one
day GIM public seminar "Participation and Industrial
Democracy". The purpose of this activity was to open
the eyes of employees to what occurred in other
companies and to stimulate discussion whilst the
investigation was being carried out. A useful aspect
of this event was the inclusion of a v i s i t to the
Alperton s i t e of The Glacier Metal Company to see
their long-standing works council in operation.*
Eventually, forty two members of staff were to attend
these meetings.
1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
The p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n in Br i ta in should be borne in
mind when c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s case as i t can a f f e c t
p e o p l e ' s a t t i t u d e s . A Labour Government had been
returned in 1974 which was pledged to supporting trade
unionism and creating a climate with the balance of
power lying firmly with the unions. The circumstances
that Company X was facing were typical of many such
disputes going on at that time. For instance, the
Grunwick case (looked at l a te r on) had s i m i l a r i t i e s
with this one, had occurred recently, and had received
much media publicity.
*Made possible due to the open nature of Glacier's council
permitting spectators.
1.3 IDENTIFYING NEEDS FROM THE TOTAL WORKFORCE
What was to be the first stage of the OD programme was
conducted by two GIM consultants, Bill Southgate and
me, at Company X on 20, 26 and 27 September 1977. The
sessions were kept reasonably brief (l| to 2 hours
duration) and the groups small (10 to 25 people) to
facilitate two way communication. There were two
objectives at this stage. First, to give the work-
force a better understanding of the nature of
representative roles (essentially a teaching task) and
second, to obtain information from the groups as to
the nature of the problems facing them. The entire
workforce of 400 people was met in this way and mainly
the level of discussion was satisfactory.
The views of the groups varied somewhat, but the
greatest differences and groupings, was noticed on the
basis of the different sites. These were as follows:
Headquarters
The site as a whole was distinctly anti-union.
They were not particularly interested in represen-
tative roles and it seemed possible that they LeLt
that representation would reduce their status in
the Company.
They felt that their situation was different from
either of the other two sites.
Business Development/Machine Shop
The Machine Shop felt that it had more in common
with the manufacturing operation than the business
development department it shared the site with.
Employees in the Machine Shop felt a need for some
form of more institutionalized representation
(they had been unionized for a long time). They
also felt that sub-groups, such as toolmakers
should have separate representation.
Business Development Department, although wanting
representative roles, were anti-union.
Manufacturing
Here a need was felt by people (mainly blue collar
and mainly the union group) to substantiate their
"rights".
A large number of people felt that membership of a
trade union was essential if representatives wore
to be taken seriously by management.
They felt a lack of communication.
They felt that their problems were distinct from
those of other sites.
They distrusted management as a whole and dislik-d
the autocratic style of the Works Director and
some of his management team.
In addition to this programme, I spent several days
talking to various key personnel including on 4
October 1977 the Chairman of the TASS group (a young
woman). I floated with her the idea of a represen-
tative council embracing all levels and all groups.
She indicated that she would need to consult her
membership, but as an individual she favoured the
idea. At the same time, she made it quite clear that
her group would not assist in setting up such a
council until after ACAS had made a recommendation
regarding recognition.
I came to the conclusion that the problems facing the
Company in the industrial relations sphere were wide-
ranging in the sense that they affected all parts of
it. Clearly the primary end result to be aimed for
initially was the resolution of the unionization and
recognition dispute. But there were problems beyond
this affecting the longer term. For instance, there
was potential, and probably actual, conflict between
various groups in the firm on a functional, site and
hierarchical basis. There was poor communication, and
understanding, between sites. There was a feeling of
mistrust in some areas.
Labour relations were beginning to move towards a
stance of confrontation, which had apparently been
absent before. If the Company recognised TASS, then
unionization would spread among the uncommitted and
collective bargaining would develop. Although this
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would enable the Company to move to a p lu r a l i s t i c
system, and get bet ter alignment with conditions in
much of the UK, i t has been seen in much of British
Industry that a confrontationalist culture tends to go
hand in hand with col lect ive bargaining. This can
r e s u l t in a bat t leground betwen two groups:
"Management" and "workers". Additionally, if Company
X were to recognise the TASS group i t would prove to
be disruptive with i ts large and important anti-union
groups found at headquarters and in business
development.
By th is time i t had become clear that a root cause of
the trouble in manufacturing stemmed from the adoption
of an inappropriate style of management by the Works
Director. This was termed by many as, "autocratic",
and in many places in the seventies such a style could
cause problems of the kind experienced here.
It is of interest to compare this situation with that
of Grunwick (Rogaly 1977) as there are ce r t a in
similari t ies . Both involve a unionization dispute in
a unitary system. Both developed into a recognition
issue involving ACAS. Both are within 70 miles of
each other and the timing is close (Grunwick in 1976).
Perhaps most s ignif icant ly both were triggered by
autocratic managers.*
* Malcolm Alden, Grunwick's supervisor of the Mail Order
Department (where the dispute originated) was described as
being a s t r i c t d isc ipl inar ian and having inter-personal
problems with his department.
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The conclusions of the inquiry into Grunwick headed by
Rt.Hon. Lord Jus t i ce Scarman s ta ted : . . . . ' they wanted
some body independent of management with the knowledge
to advise them and the strength to make some impact on
the Company. Their discontent and grievances arose
from the Company's lack of a properly developed
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s po l i cy inc luding effect ive
machinery for the examinat ion and r e d r e s s of
grievances. '
Both Grunwick and Company X were faced with a choice
from two al ternat ives: to recognise the union, and in
doing so encourage the movement, or to r e s i s t the
claim. In both cases the immediate response was to
r e s i s t . The difference was with respect to the way
res i s tance was deal t with: Company X attempting to
find out what was wrong and to offer something in
place of union recognition. Grunwick just resisted.
Perhaps at th i s stage i t wi l l be worthwhile to look at
the c o n s u l t i n g r o l e and what a l t e r n a t i v e s are
available to the consultant.
1.4 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING CONSULTING
STRATEGY.
The c o n s u l t a n t ' s r o l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s c l i e n t ( o r
client group) may be viewed along a 'directive' and
'non-directive' continuum.
12
Non-directive
Intensity
REFLECTOR
ADVOCATE
Directive
Intensity
The more d i r ec t ive consultant role behaviour wil l
r e su l t in the consultant assuming leadership and
di rec t ing the a c t i v i t y , where in the non-direct ive
mode, he may provide data for the c l i en t to use or
not. Lippitt (1979) thinks that these behaviours are
not mutual ly exc lu s ive and the p o s i t i o n on the
continuum will be chosen according to need.
Sinha (1979) goes a stage further in providing a
m o d e l .
CONSULTANT
High
Influence
Low
Influence
High
Influence
CLIENT
Low
Influence
Collaborative
Model
Clinical
Model
Engineering
Model
Survival
Model
In the collaborative model, the relationship between
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consultant and client is one where there is mutual
information and joint determination of goals.
Consulting is sometimes seen as a learning experience
with both problem identification and the derivation of
solutions being conducted in a spirit of enquiry. A
form of the collaborative model is process consulting
(Schein 1969) where the intervention by the consultant
is to help the client perceive, understand and act
upon events which occur within his organization,
helping the client to recognise the problem himself
should it reappear, and to transfer consulting skills
to the client. According to Schein this approach is
based upon the assumption that managers do not know
what is wrong and need special help in diagnosing what
their problems actually are: that consultants could
not without exhaustive and time consuming study, learn
enough about the culture of the organization to
suggest reliable courses of action and must work
jointly with employees who do from having lived within
it; and consultants must be expert at establishing an
effective helping relationship.
The clinical model of relationship implies that the
consultant has high influence over the client. The
relationship is determined by the quality of
professional expertise of the consultant and stresses
diagnosis - the diagnostic ability of the consultant
being a distinctive characteristic. In this model trie
client provides data and responds to questions whiLe
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the consultant on the other hand, diagnoses and
articulates the problem and suggests ways of solving
i t . The consultant rel ies heavily upon expert power
to gain acceptance of his solutions.
In the third, engineering model of consulting, the
client has high influence over the consultant and
tightly defines what he wants him to do. Usually this
type of work involves the consultant in gathering data
or conducting a survey; the client wants information
and the consultant's job is to provide i t .
The fourth, survival model of relationship is based on
low mutual influence between client and consultant.
This is not a desirable form and usually arises where
a consultant is imposed upon the client and the client
is disinterested in him. The relationship is one of
co-existence.
The type of client - consultant relationship which is
appropriate depends upon the nature of the assignment
and the problem to be solved. A source of difficulty
in the relationship arises when an inappropriate
consulting style is adopted in a particular sot of
circumstances. For instance, outside the field of OD,
it will be quite appropriate for a competent lawyer to
be directive in guiding his client through a tricky
business contract. On the other hand, if the purpose
is to increase the cl ient ' s own capacities and is
essentially a learning activity (as in Action Centred
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Learning), then the consultant will be non-directive
and act as an educator or f ac i l i t a to r and provide
learning situations.
The consulting strategy chosen at Company X was a
mixture of the collaborative and clinical models. It
was to be directive at times with the consultant
making key decis ions but encouraging employee
participation in the aims, planning and implementation
of the programme. An essential part of this col-
laborative approach was to use their inside knowledge
in a creative way, encouraging public debate on the
issues and in doing so legitimizing decisions.
The classic Coch and French (1948) study clearly
showed that (at least in their part icular set of
circumstances) decisions worked out by a group are
more acceptable to the group than those imposed by
authority. Further, Coch and French (implementing
change in four different groups using three different
methods - total participation, representative partici-
pation, and no part icipation) found tota l pa r t i c i -
pation to be most effective. At Company X a total
participation approach was used.
The cl ient group was treated as being al l company
employees although of course top management was the
paymaster. The implementation strategy used as i t s
basis shared responsibility for change; in which those
at the top and those at lower levels were jointLy
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involved in iden t i fy ing problems and developing
solutions. Top management does not decide everything
nor do they at tempt to abdicate au tho r i t y and
responsibi l i ty . In this strategy there is continued
interaction between top, middle and bottom levels with
a process of mutual influence occurring.
The change process i t se l f involves three specific
mechanisms: the situation must be unfreezed, changed,
and then refreezed.
To promote an unfreezing of a situation there must be
sufficient dissatisfaction with what exists at present
felt by important people and groups. At Company X the
recognition issue provided th i s . Because of i t s
importance to the functioning of the Company i t also
ensured that the intellectual and emotional commitment
of the Company's chief executive was obtained. A
vital factor.
The second stage is the change process i t se l f . To
effect change it is necessary to reveal to the person
or group new information, new concepts, or new ways of
looking at old information. This process can be aided
if the person or group can be encouraged to identify
with a role model or mentor and can learn to see
things from that other persons's point of view. One
of the most powerful ways of learning a new point of
view, or concept, or a t t i t u d e , i s to see i t in
operation: th is process can then be followed by
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scanning for information specifically relevant to
one's own circumstances. At Company X the public
nature of the Glacier Works Council provided this
opportunity and gave "hands-on" experience.
As an aid to refreezing it is important that the group
create and design their own system even if in fact
this is limited to detail change of an original
concept.
These ideas were to be incorporated into the
consulting strategy.
1.5 DIAGNOSIS
In looking at a Company there are three elements to be
taken into account: environment, structure and
processes, and people.
Environment may be defined as the external conditions
with which the Company must deal and includes market,
technology, investors, governmental regulations, and
the social culture and values in which it operates.
Structure and processes are the formal mechanisms and
systems of the organization that are designed to
channel behaviour towards corporate goals and include
organization structure, job descriptions, information
systems, policies, and appraisal and reward systems.
When considering people we must take into account
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their ab i l i t i e s , needs, values and expectations.
Organization development may perhaps most usefully be
seen as a process which diagnoses organizational
problems by looking for incongruencies between
environment, structure, processes and people, and then
aims at getting a bet ter f i t between them (Beer,
1980) .
In choosing a solution to a l l ev ia t e the Company's
problems, the congruence concept was brought into
play. As we mentioned e a r l i e r , the environmental
conditions in England in 1977 were influencing the
values and expectations of a significant number of the
Company's employees. It wil l be remembered that a
Labour Government was returned to power in 1974,
committed to supporting trade unions and ensuring that
much power rested with the unions and labour. There
was also much media publ ic i ty given to recognition
issues - Grunwick being a prominent case.
I judged that if the Company developed a written
constitution, which explicitly recognised the power of
representat ive groups, and which incorporated a
policy-making works council, then this would provide
both a s t ructure (and process) in l ine with environ-
mental needs and people ' s a s p i r a t i o n s , and b<> a
powerful enough alternative to gain the acceptance of
reluctant parties.
This kind of remedy was not new to the Company as they
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had expressed an in te res t in Works Councils when
approaching GIM. Additionally, feedback from the 26
people who had by this time attended the "Par t ic i -
pation and Industr ial Democracy" seminars was quite
positive and indicated a general in teres t in the
concepts discussed and what was seen of the Works
Council at Glacier. However, the l a t t e r was not
without cr i t ic ism with two factors contributing to
t h i s . F i r s t , the unusually poor qua l i t y of the
Glacier agenda on the f i r s t two v i s i t s , and second,
comments made by the Glacier convenor at the seminars
to the effect that a Works Council cannot operate
sa t i s f ac to r i ly unless i t has 100 per cent union
membership (which Glacier had at that time). This
gave Company X people a problem as i t seemed very
unlikely that the Company would become fully unionized
on all i ts si tes and in all i ts departments.
It was decided in late October 1977 (mainly by top
management but also involving the representative
committee) that the Company should move towards
developing a Company Constitution.
1.6 DEVELOPING THE CONSTITUTION.
The OD programme proceeded into i t s second stage with
further meetings of the small groups and embracing as
f a r a s p o s s i b l e a l l e m p l o y e e s . These s e s s i o n s
occurred on 31 October, and 1, 2 and 3 November 1977.
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They operated on a similar basis to the first series
but instead of being led solely by a GIM Consultant
now they were jointly conducted by me and the
Company's Chief Executive. There were three
objectives:
to develop thinking on the representative council
idea
to identify possible constituencies from which
representatives should be elected, and
to enable the chief executive to meet the entire
workforce both to hear their views and to answer
questions.
The idea behind this implementation strategy was to
involve those who were to be governed by the consti-
tution in its design, planning and implementation with
aims of overcoming resistance to change, of making the
constitution more effective and of legitimizing the
decision. It was a total participation approach (as
in Coch and French) and although very time-consuming,
it is thorough.
It was most useful having me and the chief executive
working together. My role was to provide ideas, to
stimulate discussion, most important, to build up
constituencies by passing information from group to
group. The chief executive learned of problems and
added legitimacy to the process.
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The meetings demonstrated that the majority of
employees supported the notion of setting up a form of
council. It became apparent from these discussions
that two levels would be needed. Three Site Councils
to deal with local issues and with the site manager as
management member, and, a Company Council to deal with
multi-site issues. Management member in this case
should be the chief executive or his nominee. The
idea of site and company councils tackled as far as
possible the danger of rank and file members feeling
rather remote from the real strings of power. The
principle was discussed that decisions should be
taken, and matters considered, at the lowest possible
level.
The groups made good progress in identifying con-
stituencies. The normal constituency base for site
councils was by department and function, with between
nine and thirteen representatives involved in each.
Division by function embraces the idea of there being
representation from different hierarchical levels as
the figure shows.
A major difficulty in setting up representative
councils is in ensuring that all groups are repre-
sented and that all groups are prepared to meet
together in such a Council. In Manufacturing Site
Council it was necessary to recognise the TASS group
as a separate power group.
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GRADE
EXECUTIVE
SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT
MEMBER
MONTHLY STAFF
REP.
WEEKLY STAFF
REP.
BLUE-COLLAR
FUNCTIONS
I t was a l s o decided t h a t Company Council should be
e l e c t e d from the v a r i o u s s i t e c o u n c i l s , t he
cons t r a in t s being a maximum number of 16 people with
representa t ion from a l l groups.
REPS.
HQ SITE COUNC
ENG.SUPPORT -
ADMIN.
-
SALES
BUS. MGRS.
SECRETARIES -
SITE MGRS.
IL
2M
1M
1W
2M
1M
1W
1
COMPANY COUNCIL
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+
15 MAX
BUS.DEV./M/C SHOP
SITE COUNCIL
M/C SHOP
BUS.DEV.
SOLUTION
SHOP
SITE MGR
4W
2W
2M
1W
1
REPS.
MANUFACTURING
SITE COUNCIL
TASS GROUP - 5
NON-UNION - 5
MANAGEMENT &
SPECIALISTS - 2M
SITE MGR.
- 1
M = Monthly paid W = Weekly Paid
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On 14 November 1977 I was reminded that Company X was
a subsidiary of a multi-national enterprise when the
Vice-President responsible for it visited from the
General Office in New York to find out what was
happening with respect to industrial relations and
particularly GIM's part in it. There was rigorous
discussion with him before he fully accepted and
endorsed the idea of representative councils. He was
in favour of recognising TASS right away but the
General Manager refused.
At this time I supplied Company X's General Manager
with a copy of a GIM publication, 'Draft Procedure
Agreement', with the understanding that he would draw
up a Company Constitution based on it. We discussed
the detail design on a couple of occasions as the
document was being prepared. The Draft Procedure
Agreement is shown in Appendix I.
On 25 November 1977 a management training programme
was run in a local hotel by myself and a fellow GIM
consultant, Eric Laws. The purpose of this activity
was to acquaint senior managers with the now
structure, their roles in it, and differences in
behaviour which may be exhibited by people in their
executive and representative roles. On 1 December,
Bill Southgate ran a skills training course on hearing
appeals. I also prepared a representative training
programme but this was not run.
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1 . 7 COMPANY X DRAFT CONSTITUTION
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. The management and employees of Company X have a
common object ive to ensure the continued success
of the o p e r a t i o n s of the company in the deve lop -
ment, manufacture and market ing of i t s p roduc t s
and in ensuring the eff ic iency of those operat ions
in the in teres ts of employees, shareholders and
customers.
2. Management must possess au thor i ty to make
decisions about the operation of the company. The
bounds of that authority, however, are limited by
policies set out by the parent company on behalf
of shareholders, policies established in the
contracts negotiated with customers and policies
agreed between management and employees.
Thus management recognises the power of employees
to set limits to the extent of management decision
making authority while employees recognise that
within those limits management has the authority
continuously to make decisions (subject to indi-
vidual appeal) which are necessary for the
efficient operation of the enterprise.
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3. I t is recognised that continuous changes in the
policies bounding the decision making authority of
managers is inevitable and that where they affect
the interests of employees they cannot be changed
without the agreement of a l l who might be
a f f e c t e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , a p o l i c y making
inst i tut ion shall be established in the form of 3
s i t e counci ls , each composed of the s i t e manager
and representa t ives of a l l employees on the s i t e
and a company council composed of the General
Manager and representatives of a l l employees.
4. Effective agreement on policy changes requires
that a l l members of a council shal l individual ly
possess the r ight to veto proposals from other
members until such modifications have been made as
to render them acceptable to a l l , and that the
s t a t u s quo s h a l l p r e v a i l u n t i l agreement is
reached. It is recognised that if a member of a
council threatens to use power in an attempt to
force change upon others then such an act is a
breach of the cons t i tu t ion establ ished by this
procedure agreement.
5. An individual employee shall have right of appeal
to higher authority against his manager's decision
if i t i s f e l t to be unfa i r or unjus t to the
individual or not in keeping with the terms and
sp i r i t of agreed policies.
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6. Every employee s h a l l have personal r i g h t of access
to the manager who a l l o c a t e s work to him, has
personal knowledge of h i s performance and who has
the a u t h o r i t y to make dec i s i ons about him based on
t h a t knowledge.
SECTION 2 NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE
INTENTION
1. The company and i t s employees agree t ha t i t i s in
their mutual in teres t to observe a negotiating
procedure by which all issues arising between them
can be resolved as speedily as possible.
2. The use of power or the threat to use power either
by managers or representatives in an attempt to
force through a proposition at any stage of the
negotiation is a breach of this procedure.
3. Issues which af fec t one person only and are
questions of felt unfairness within existing
policy wi l l be dea l t with under an appeals
procedure.
4. Issues which affect one section only and are not
felt by other representatives to affect other
sections will be negotiated between management and
the representative or representatives of that
section.
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5. Gene ra l i s s u e s a f f e c t i n g a l l s e c t i o n s w i t h i n a
s i t e w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o t h e s i t e c o u n c i l .
Gene ra l i s s u e s a f f e c t i n g more than one s i t e w i l l
be r e f e r r ed to the company c o u n c i l .
6. Normal e a r n i n g s w i l l be pa id t o employees in
r e s p e c t of t ime s p e n t in mee t ing management to
reso lve i s s u e s .
PROCEDURE
1. Employee R e p r e s e n t a t i v e / S e c t i o n Manager.
1.1 If the employees are not satisfied with the
conditions on the i r section the represen-
ta t ives will raise the matter on behalf of
their constituents with the section manager.
1.2 The section manager concerned must meet the
representa t ives with the leas t possible
delay and will use his best endeavours to
resolve the issue consulting with other
members of management if he feels this to be
necessary.
2. Representative/Higher Management
2.1 In the event of the section manager being
unable to reach agreement with the represun
ta t ive rapidly he wil l refer i t to a higher
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level of management and the negotiations
will continue there.
2.2 If, at the beginning of the discussions
between the section manager and the repre-
sentative, the section manager realises that
the changes sought are outside his personal
authority, then he will ascertain who is the
manager possessing the required authority
and refer the matter to him immediately.
3. Council
3.1 If discussions between the representatives
and higher management fail to resolve the
issue then at the discretion of either
representative or management, the matter
will be placed on the agenda of the next
meeting of the appropriate council.
3.2 Issues which involve more than one section
or site or which can affect other sections
or sites may, at any stage in the Negotia-
ting Procedure, be referred to the appro-
priate council.
3.3 Should the issue in question require urgent
consideration then either the represen-
tatives or management may call for an
extraordinary meeting of the appropriate
council.
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4. Group Industrial Relations Manager/Trade Union
Official.
4.1 If at any stage of negotiation either party
to the discussion feels that the presence of
a personnel officer and/or a trade union
off ic ia l would ass is t in c la r i f ica t ion of
the issues, then he or they will be asked to
attend the negotiations.
4.2 Should the most senior personnel manager
feel that the issues under negotiation are
of importance to other areas of the group,
then he has the right to be present.
4.3 Management wi l l r e f ra in from agreeing
changes with trade union officials without
the presence of elected representatives of
the employees who may be affected.
5. Trade Union Representation
If the majority of members in a department vote a
union member as their representative and that
representative wants an off ic ia l of the union to
ass i s t him in discussion with management, the
management will meet that official.
1.8 COUNCILS IN OPERATION
The s i t e and company councils f i r s t met ear ly in 1978
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without the TASS group.
On 16 January 1978 I arranged a meeting between the
general manager, personnel manager,* myself and
Wilfred Brown at the latter's home in London. The
reason for this was that Brown had spent 25 years as
chief executive of The Glacier Metal Company (from
1939 to 1964) and thus had faced problems very similar
to those which then faced the general manager. Brown
indicated that at Glacier all councillors (except
management member) were by now union members. He
firmly advocated the idea that the Company should do a
deal with TASS, recognise them, and actively encourage
unionization in return for participation in councils.
It was my view that constitutional councils could
operate equally satisfactorily if representatives were
not unionized. The major advantages of this are in
respect of openness, the likelihood that information
will remain confidential and a simplified power
structure that does not have to take into account
union policy. However, at this stage my first
priority was to get councils operating and I thought
that to achieve this would mean recognising the TASS
group. I was of the opinion that once they were
operating satisfactorily (which would take time)
* Late in November 1977, the Company replaced the original
personnel manager with a Scot with experience of working
for the multi-national in the United States.
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people would value the ins t i tu t ions so highly that
they may see union membership as being unnecessary.
On 17 January 1978, the report from ACAS was received
by the Company recommending it to recognise TASS with
respect only to blue-collar employees. The Company
rejected the recommendation. During the early part of
1978, the various councils continued to meet. This
placed individual TASS members in a position where
they had to make a choice between participating in the
new Company Constitution, which they knew the majority
of their colleagues wanted, or to remain in the union
- as the TASS group leadership would not take part
unless the Company accepted the ACAS recommendation.
The matter was brought to a head when the Chairman of
the TASS group led a s t r ike involving some 30 blue-
collar manufacturing employees. The issue was her
refusal to sign a merit form (a procedure agreed in
council). She was suspended by the Company. The
s t r ike , of very short duration and in effect token,
was broken and within two weeks she left the Company
of her own accord.
With her leadership los t , TASS members gradually
decided to take part in the Constitution and in time
gave up their membership of the union. During this
period, I gathered that the Company applied a certain
amount of pressure for th is to occur. The more
mil i tant members - part of the leadership group -
voluntarily left the Company.
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During 1978 Company X continued to send their members
to the GIM participation seminars and visi t to works
council. In a l l over ten percent of the workforce
attended. The Constitution was operated and developed
over the next three years. Surviving changes in the
Company's top management.* My involvement over this
period was from a distance.
It became apparent to me by 1981 that things were
going quite well at Company X and warranted further
investigation. I arranged to interview some of the
key people from all sites on 20 February and 16 April
1981. The main findings were as follows:
In general, the organizational model is respected in
the Company and recognised by a l l the groups I met
(more on this later) to make a useful contribution to
Company effectiveness.
The particular benefits of councils generally agreed
to be of importance (in order of their strength) wore:
an improvement in communication within the Company
more consultation over issues facing the Company
- a sharpening up of management with managers
"thinking more before acting."
* Both the general manager and the business development
manager were moved to other parts of the multi-national as
their assignments at Company X terminated.
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a change in management style which had become more
informal and involved.*
a better understanding between s i t es .
During the programme i t was possible to examine the
minutes o£ various council meetings. It was en-
couraging to find that a number of pol ic ies and
procedures have been agreed in Council. These
include:
a policy on merit payment for hourly and weekly
paid employees
a policy on redundancy en t i t l ed "Security of
Employment"
a policy on holidays
an appointments procedure operating on the basis
of internal candidates f i rs t
- a pol icy concerning the a p p l i c a t i o n of work
measurement
a procedure dealing with absenteeism
Contracts of Employment
a policy for regulating hours of work.
* In this connectiom i t transpired that the Works Director
had been moved sideways into support role.
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It was also found that the Company was developing a
Policy Handbook which will be issued to all concerned.
Of the policies mentioned above perhaps the most
important, in terms of increasing organizational
effectiveness, is that dealing with the rating of
merit to be conducted by managers down to shop floor
level. This was the issue that so incensed the TASS
leader, and is a control factor now rarely found in
British Industry.
The council minutes reveal not only what has been
agreed but also give an indication of how wide-ranging
are the issues discussed and the nature of the
meetings. The first observation is that in all cases
council minutes are produced to a high standard and in
a very professional way. It is clear that an
important part of the meeting is the presentation of
the business position by Management Member (as in the
Glacier case). Here there is information given about
such things as sales performance against forecast,
forward load, profitability, cost comparison with
American plants, inventory levels and "the Return on
People Ratio." There is not, however, any evidence o£
other representatives questioning Management Member.
I noticed that my planned visit to conduct the feed-
back programme was reported and a decision taken as to
who should be interviewed. I also noticed, that there
is exchange of information on various matters and that
at a manufacturing site council meeting the site
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manager was asked to justify a lavish dinner given for
some employees at a well known local restaurant. Two
of the chairpersons were women.
It is understood by all concerned that at these
meetings any issue may be put on the agenda for
discussion although evidence could not be found which
would disclose their source. I gained the impression
that most initiatives were management based although
the councils are not formally management led (there
are independent chairmen). The appeal procedure
seemed to operate satisfactorily and the Constitution
had remained stable over the period considered
although some constituencies had changed with circum-
stances. The withdrawal of TASS as a power group was
such a factor.
Observable faults in 1981 were few but I drew the
attention of the Company to four things. First, the
irregularity of Company Council meetings, these being
convened at management whim (site councils met
monthly). Second, the delay (usually two days) in the
publication of minutes causing representatives to be
better informed than managers and supervisors who were
not themselves representatives. Because of this,
representatives were expected to convey the results of
meetings back to their constituents when this should
be done through the executive system. Third, the
personnel manager filling the role of Chairman of
Company Council was not felt to be requisite by
36
various representatives I met. It was felt by them
that he was not sufficiently independent. Finally,
there was the lack of representative training.
Although trust is a difficult element to quantify, it
is an important factor in building good industrial
relations. In 1977 quite a large number of people at
Company X said that they distrusted management. The
question of trust was specifically introduced into the
1981 interviews and, without exception, interviewees
now said that they trusted the Company and i t s
management.
NOTE
At a meeting with Company X's Personnel Manager which
occurred on 3 February 1984, I learned that Councils were
still operating well and highly valued in the Company.
Trade unions were still absent.
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2.0 DISCUSSION.
In reviewing this case study one is conscious that i t
involves two different, and in some ways, conflicting
things. On the one hand there is an immediate need to
solve an industrial relations problem, with a longer
term aim of making the Company more effect ive in
operation. On the other, we are touching on poli t ical
matters involving the rights of people at work.
A fundamental question i s , 'How can organizat ional
policies or social practices be developed which will
permit some reasonable matching of human needs and
organizational demands?1
The case study powerful ly demons t ra tes t h a t a
programme of o rgan i za t i on development has the
potent ia l to a l l ev i a t e th i s dilemma, and indeed in
this appl ica t ion, i t achieved everything that was
aimed for. The f i r s t part of th is discussion will
examine OD i t s e l f - what i t commonly involves, i t s
aims and i ts potential .
Perhaps the most interesting aspects of this study are
two findings connected not with OD but with the
operation of cons t i tu t iona l councils . It was not
predicted at entry e i ther that the TASS group would
leave the i r union or that the desire for a system of
employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n would prove not to have
universal appeal. These two findings are explored in
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more depth in the second and third parts of the
discussion.
2 . 1 ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT.
The twent ie th century has seen the emergence of
"bureaucratic" organizations as the primary means of
bringing together and u t i l i z i n g c a p i t a l , labour and
technology for the p r o d u c t i o n of the goods and
serv ices required by a developed economy. In the
interes ts of competitive efficiency i t has emphasised
s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n and c o n t r o l r e s u l t i n g in an
organ iza t iona l form tha t created many simple and
rout ine tasks tha t did not re ly on high l eve l s of
individual competence.
The emergence of the union movement in the 1800's was
an early indication of the human costs associated with
bureaucratic organizations. Workers challenged their
economic contract with the company and renegotiated i t
through col lect ive bargaining. For a time more money
seemed to allow organ iza t ions to function well (the
American term for pay, "compensation", perhaps gives a
better feeling for the part money played in th is ) , but
in more recent t imes more and more cos t ly labour
se t t l emen t s have obtained minimal l eve l s of commit-
ment. Although these problems are mainly res t r ic ted
to blue collar workers, problems of commitment, turn-
over and unioniza t ion have spread to c e r t a i n white
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col lar areas.
The most important r e a l i t y of today i s a world of ever
accelerating change in markets, technology, and some-
times values as we l l , which has placed a s t r a i n on
bureaucratic organization. Organizat ion development
has emerged in the l a s t twenty years or so and been
used to help o rgan iza t i ons to change and to improve
thei r effectiveness.
Organizat ion development (OD) i s defined in var ious
ways. For ins tance Burke and Schmidt (1971) 'Using
knowledge and t e c h n i q u e s from the b e h a v i o u r a l
s c i ences , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l development is a process
which a t t e m p t s t o i n c r e a s e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
e f f e c t i v e n e s s by i n t e g r a t i n g ind iv idua l d e s i r e s for
growth and development with o r g a n i z a t i o n a l goa l s .
Typica l ly , t h i s process is a planned change e f f o r t
which involves a t o t a l system over a period of t ime,
and t h e s e change e f f o r t s a re r e l a t e d to the
o rgan i za t i on ' s mission'.
Or a def ini t ion with a less behavioural emphasis Winn
(1969) 'The term Organisation Development . . . implies
a normative, re-education strategy intended to affect
systems of b e l i e f s , values and a t t i t u d e s within the
o r g a n i z a t i o n so t h a t i t can adap t b e t t e r to the
acce le ra t ed change in technology, in our i n d u s t r i a l
environment and Society in general. I t also includes
formal o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g which is f r e -
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quently i n i t i a t e d , f ac i l i t a t ed and reinforced by be-
havioural changes.
The def ini t ion of OD I will offer i s :
A p l a n n e d , s y s t e m a t i c programme i n i t i a t e d by a
Company's management with the aim of making the
o r g a n i z a t i o n more e f f e c t i v e and based upon the
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s is
enhanced to the extent that the programme f a c i l i t a t e s
t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l and c o r p o r a t e
objec t ives .
The g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of OD i n c l u d e the
following:
i t is a system-wide change effort
i t t y p i c a l l y p laces equal emphasis on solving
i m m e d i a t e p r o b l e m s and a i d i n g l o n g - t e r m
developments
i t places more emphasis than other approaches to a
c o l l a b o r a t i v e process of d a t a - c o l l e c t i o n , d i a g -
nosis and action for arriving at problem solution
i t sometimes seeks the creation of se l f -di rected
change to which people are more committed
i t f e a t u r e s an agen t of change who b r i n g s
knowledge about organization design and management
p r a c t i c e to the s i t u a t i o n as well as ac t ing as a
f a c i l i t a t o r .
41
OD is a problem oriented activity and requires the
designation of an end result, the selection of a
method to achieve that end result, and the
implementation of the method. However, before this
process can commence and an end result be identified
it is likely that quite a lot of data will need to be
gathered.
The entry process usually involves only the leaders of
the organization. If a decision is reached to
proceed, and this will be based on limited infor-
mation, then the next stage will be to collect data
from a wide variety of people and parts of the organi-
zation leading to diagnosis. The kind of data which
is needed is historical, structural (policies,
communications patterns, methods of decision-making,
personnel systems, etc.) and interpretive data
(attitudes, atmosphere and relationships). There are
four basic methods for collecting data on how organi-
zations function and how people in them feel and
behave.
Questionnaires are a form of indirect, structured
interviewing. They can be administered to an entire
workforce or to a representative sample, and may be
purpose designed or one of many standardised forms
developed in recent years. A major advantage of them
is that a lot of data can be easily collected; a
disadvantage is that of obtaining adequate feedback.
The attitude survey is a form of questionnaire which
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permits the respondents to evaluate such things as the
quality of management, pay and pay-related items,
working conditions and other job-related factors. The
questionnaire is often completed anonymously so that
employees can express their views freely and without
threat, whether real or imagined.
The simplest and most direct way to find out what is
going on in an organization is to talk to people.
Interviews may be either structured or unstructured.
The structured interview has s imi la r i t i e s to the
questionnaire as the interviewer asks very specific
quest ions and tends to guide answers into pre-
determined response categories. In many ways un-
structured interviewing is preferable as it is likely
to throw up some of the less obvious factors affecting
the situation.
A lot of useful data can be gained by observing what
people do and how they behave at work. The exami-
nation of secondary data such as memos, notices,
reports and organization charts can also provide
useful background information.
The data collecting process and the analysis which
follows it should aim not just at providing a measure
which shows, for example, that "65% of people in
manufacturing think communications are poor whilst
only 25% of those in marketing and administration
agree". This is of limited usefulness on its own and
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would benefit from a description and explanation of
the causes, for it is this that can lead to action.
The diagnostic process is critical to the eventual
success of the OD programme yet it most be recognised
that the problem may be rooted in either the formal or
informal components of the organization. The formal
components are more readily observable and rational
comprising such things as job descriptions, spans of
control and hierarchical levels, operating policies
and production efficiency. The informal components
are, on the other hand, not so readily seen and may
include power and influence patterns, interpersonal
relations, intergroup relations, perceptions of trust,
credibility and emotional feelings. Although these
behaviours can sometimes be affected by changes in
structure, they are often deep-seated and need
additional changes.
The diagnostic step should specify objectives for
change which should be as explicit and measurable as
possible. This will aid the choice of a method (the
solution) and evaluation of outcomes. Experience and
judgement are critical to this phase - one reason why
change agents are frequently specialist external
consultants.
The methods, that is to say solutions, employed in on
are numerous but they can be categorised into those
mainly concerned with structure, or processes, or
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people - although a clear line cannot be drawn between
the three categories as they interact so much.
St ruc tura l change wil l mainly involve organization
design and job design. For instance, a change in
company strategy may cause i t to change i t s structure
from one which is functionally-based to a divisiona-
l i s ed , or in other circumstances, to a matrix form.
This change may bring in i t s t r a in a need for more
business managers with general management sk i l l s , or
in the case of matrix, a need to be able to cope with
having more than one manager and g r e a t e r ro le
ambiguities.
Any change in the width or level of a work role
involves a s t ruc tu ra l change (a lbe i t quite a small
one) . Inc reas ing the width of a job by adding
additional operations to i t or by allowing rotation is
usually termed job enlargement; raising i ts level by
allowing more d i sc re t ion is job enrichment. Both
techniques are used in OD to improve job interest .
Management by o b j e c t i v e s (MBO) has been widely
discussed and used during the l a s t two decades. The
o r i g i n a l work of Drucker (1954) and subsequent
w r i t i n g s by o t h e r s (Odiorne 1965, Reddin 1970,
Ivancevich et al 1975) provide the basis for three
guidelines underpinning MBO:
superiors and subordinates meet and discuss objec
tives which if met would contribute to corporate
45
goals
superiors and subordinates jointly establish
attainable objectives for the subordinates
superiors and subordinates meet at a predetermined
later date to evaluate the subordinates' progress
towards the objectives.
The exact procedures employed in implementing MBO vary
from company to company and from unit to unit, how-
ever, the basic elements of objective setting, parti-
cipation of subordinates in objective setting, and
feedback and evaluation are essential parts of any OD
programme. The intended consequences include greater
role clarity, better integration of individual efforts
into corporate objectives and improved attitudes.
MBO, and performance appraisal systems in general, are
what I will classify as organizational processes.
Changes in organizational structure or processes is
likely to require skill development in such areas as
appraisal interviewing, influencing, running and
attending meetings.
OD programmes centreing around behavioural development
methods delve deeply into group and individual
behaviour processes; intergroup, intragroup and indi-
vidual behaviours are often confounded by emotional
and perceptual processes which interfere with ef£ec
tive organizational functioning. Behavioural develop
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ment has received the greatest amount of at tention
from OD spec ia l i s t s and a considerable number of
methods have been devised for a t tack ing these
problems.
One of the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l OD approaches,
sens i t iv i ty t ra ining, is designed to increase the
awareness of individuals with respect to their own
motivations and behaviour patterns as well as those of
others . This is accomplished through the use of
training groups (T-groups). In the extreme, the
technique uses a group confrontation method of achieve
i t s fundamental goal of increased awareness by
individuals of their own behaviour (Smith 1966,
Bradford, Gibb and Benne 1964).
To attempt to achieve i ts objectives individuals who
volunteer (or are sent to) the T-group meet at a
location away from the workplace and may be complete
strangers coming from different organizations, or they
may all come from the same firm. The groups, usually
10 - 15 people, typically meet for 7 - 1 0 days: there
is no set agenda or required material to cover as in a
typical structured seminar, instead the members are
faced with a very unstructured situation in which the
decisions as to what direct ion to take must be made by
the group i t se l f . The sessions are moderated by a
"trainer", whose function is to clarify the basic goal
of the sess ion and to a s s i s t the group in t he i r
functioning but to offer no leadership.
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In an environment like this there are high anxiety
levels in the group as some members attempt to impose
structure on others. Conflicts of this sort are used
as a background for group discussions of individual
behaviour as they relate to the particular problems.
Another widely used behavioural approach is Grid OD
based on Blake and Mouton's Managerial Grid (1964).
The grid is a two-dimensional framework with one
dimension representing a concern for production and
the other a concern for people. A scale from 1 (low)
to 9 (high) makes it possible to quantify a manager's
concern for production and people.
Grid OD is a long-range effort programmed for three to
five years and aims at moving an organization to a
"9,9" management culture, one that has a high concern
for both people and production. Such a culture is
characterised by shared goals, an understanding of
those goals by everyone, high commitment to work
accomplishment, high collaboration and high trust
(Blake and Mouton, 1969).
There are six developmental phases:
Phase 1: A one week laboratory training programme for
all members of the organization in which they
study managerial grid concepts and use these
concepts to learn about their managerial stylo,
group decision making and OD. People at the top
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of the hierarchy are expected to attend f i r s t .
Phase 2: Concentrates on team development for a l l
groups in the firm, starting at the top.
Phase 3: Using grid concepts groups examine the i r
r e l a t ionsh ips and develop plans for improved
coord ination
Phase 4: Using an agenda specified by Blake and
Mouton, the top management group meets for several
days to develop an idea l model of the firm
(structure, processes, culture). A plan for OD is
made .
Phase 5: Task, forces are formed to implement the
organizational changes specified in the plan.
Phase 6: Measure changes that have occurred and
stabil ize and achievements. Set new goals for OD.
The grid programme s t a r t s at the top, moves down
through the whole organization, comes back to the top
for the development of a change plan, and again moves
down for the implementation of the plan. It operates
on the basis of creat ing a c r i t i c a l mass of ind iv i -
duals and groups who have been exposed to tho same
concepts and who share the same be l ie f s and valuos
about management. It aims at improving teamwork ,.m<l
changing management style across the whole company.
These then are some of the tools of OD. Let us now
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look at the change process itself.
Kurt Lewin (1947) was the earliest pioneer in identi-
fying three phases of change: unfreezing, changing
and refreezing. To promote an unfreezing of a situa-
tion present behaviour or attitudes must be discon-
firmed over a period of time. The individual or group
must discover that his or their assumptions about the
world are not validates, or that some behaviour does
not lead to expected outcomes and may even lead to
undesirable outcomes. Such disconfirmation can arise
from a variety of sources. There must be some dis-
comfort felt for there to be motivation to change.
The second stage is the change process itself. To aid
change it is necessary to reveal to the person or
group new information, new concepts or new ways of
looking at old information. This process can be
further aided if the person or group can be encouraged
to identify with a role model or mentor and can learn
to see things from that other person's point of view.
One of the most powerful ways of learning a new point
of view, or concept, or attitude, is to see it in
operation. This process can then be followed by
scanning for information specifically relevant to
one's particular problem, and maybe adapting the
original concept to suit. The process of adaptation
is important, not only in deriving a better systom,
but in helping to refreeze the new situation that
results.
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One of the most important studies into overcoming
resistance to change was conducted by Coch and French
(1948) in a clothing factory. To describe i t briefly.
The two researchers worked with four different groups
of factory operators who were being paid on a modified
piece rate basis . For each of these four groups a
minor change in the work procedure was installed by a
different method, and the results were carefully re-
corded to see what, if any, symptoms of resistance
occurred. The four experimental groups were roughly
matched with respect to efficiency ratings and degree
of cohesiveness; in each group the proposed change
modified the established work procedure to about the
same degree.
The work change was introduced to the f i r s t group by
what the researchers called a "no-participation"
method. This small group of operators was called into
a room where some staff people told the members that
there was a need for a minor methods change in their
work procedures. The staff people then explained the
change to the operators in de ta i l and gave them the
reasons for the change. The operators were then sent
back to the job with i n s t r u c t i o n s to work in
accordance with the new method.
The second group of operators was introduced to the
work change by a "part icipat ion-through-representa-
tion" method - a variat ion of the approach used with
the third and fourth groups which turned out to be of
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l i t t l e significance.
The third and fourth groups of operators were both
i n t r o d u c e d to the work change on a " t o t a l -
par t ic ipa t ion" bas is . All the operators in these
groups met with the staff men concerned. The staff
men dramatical ly demonstrated the need for cost
reduction. A general agreement was reached that some
savings could be effected. The groups then discussed
how exist ing work methods could be improved and
unnecessary operations eliminated. When the work
methods were agreed on, al l the operators were trained
in the new methods, and a l l were observed by the time-
study men for purposes of es tabl ishing a new piece
rate on the job.
The researchers reported a marked contrast between the
resu l t s achieved by the dif ferent methods of in t ro -
ducing this change:
No-Participation Group.
The most striking difference was between Group 1, the
no-participation group, and Groups 3 and 4, the to ta l -
pa r t i c ipa t ion groups. The output of Group 1 dropped
immediately to about two thirds of i ts previous output
r a t e . The output rate stayed at about this Level
throughout the period of 30 days after the change was
introduced. The researchers further reported:
'Resistance developed almost immediately after the
change occurred. Marked expressions of aggression
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against management occurred, such as conflict with
the methods engineer, ... hostility toward the
supervisor, deliberate restriction of production,
and lack, of cooperation with the supervisor.
There were 17% quits in the first 40 days.
Grievances were filed about piece rates; but when
the rate was checked, it was found to be a little
"loose".'
Total-Participation Groups
In contrast with this record, Groups 3 and 4 showed a
smaller initial drop in output and a very rapid
recovery not only to the previous production rate but
to a rate that exceeded the previous rate. In these
groups there were no signs of hostility toward the
staff people or toward the supervisors, and there were
no quits during the experimental period.
Without going into all the researchers1 decisions
based on these experiments, it can be fairly stated
that they concluded that resistance to method changes
could be overcome by getting the people involved in
the change to participate in making it.
It is characteristic of OD that change management is
often collaborative and participative in nature but it
is not always the case. Many organizational changes
are implemented through the authority of the top
manager's position. The manager defines the problem
based on information that is gathered by others and
53
develops the solution by himself or with the help of a
limited number of people. The information may be
gathered by his immediate subordinates, members of a
staff group and/or a consultant. The solution may be
recommended by them but the top person makes the final
decision. Once a decision is made, change is communi-
cated and activated by command.
At the opposite extreme to top-down uni la tera l ap-
proaches are bottom-up changes where almost complete
responsibility for defining the problem and developing
a solution is assumed by people at lower levels of the
organization. This responsibility may be delegated by
top management, or the i n i t i a t i v e may be taken by a
group or an individual who sees the need for change.
The frequency of this kind of process is limited and
is most likely caused by some external stimulus such
as a training course.
The top-down and bottom-up approaches represent
extremes on a power d i s t r ibu t ion and involvement
continuum. In the middle lies an approach to change,
in which those at the top and those at lower levels
are jo in t ly involved in identifying problems and/or
developing solutions. Top management does not decide
everything nor do they abdicate authority and respon-
s i b i l i t y for the change to lower levels . In this
shared strategy there is almost continual interaction
between top, middle and bottom levels and a process of
mutual influence occurs.
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The shared responsibil i ty approach usually takes
longer to implement but results in a more r ea l i s t i c
solution being chosen and more commitment. Perhaps
the best example of its widespread use - although not
necessarily in the context of formal OD - is in Japan
where consultation prior to changes takes a great deal
of time, but generally results in high commitment and
rapid implementation.
Organizations are socia l inventions designed to
achieve economic and other purposes while at the same
time fulf i l l ing member (employee) needs. The two
things go hand in hand.
The process of OD aims to bring about a better f i t
between the environment, structure and processes, and
people - where each element is of equal importance.
The organization's environment may be defined as the
external conditions with which i t must deal and
includes markets, technology, investors, governmental
regulations, and the social culture and value system
in which it operates. Structure and processes are the
formal mechanisms and systems of the organization that
are designed to channel behaviour towards corporate
goals and include organization structure, job descrip-
tions, policies, information systems, and appraisal
and reward systems. When considering people wo mist
take into account their a b i l i t i e s , needs, values and
expectations.
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OD may perhaps most usefully be seen as a process
which diagnoses organizational problems by looking for
incongruencies between environment, s t ruc tu re , pro-
cesses and people and then aims at get t ing a be t te r
f i t between them. Examination of my role in the
Company X study provides one way of successfully
introducing change in organizat ions . I n i t i a l entry
into the company was a delicate process with an explo-
sive industrial relations situation to deal with.
My in i t i a l stance to al l parties in the Company aimed
at encouraging t h e i r confidence in me and the
consultancy I represented. Once the nature of the
problems was discovered i t was clear that we needed to
give c l e a r d i r e c t i o n to the p r o j e c t . In o ther
circumstances, as for instance in Action Learning
(Revans 1982), my s tance would have been l e s s
directive and more reflective; my role then being more
to f a c i l i t a t e and create a climate for learning.
However, in th i s study such a purely col laborat ive
approach did not seem requisi te .
Despite the need to give direction to the programme, I
preferred to adopt a s t ra tegy of seeking active
participation from the people concerned in working out
a solution, but realised that before a shared strategy
can be successful , the r igh t condit ions must ex i s t .
For instance
Managers must be open-minded to subordinates '
suggestions
56
- Managers must feel secure otherwise they will
perceive any participation by subordinates as a
threat to their authority and undermining their
status
Employees must want to become involved and have
the capacity to participate.
These conditions seemed to exist as well at Company X
as in any other company I had experience of so we
decided to use a participative strategy. Time and
cost to the client is an important consideration in
consulting work. In approaching this task, had a full
representative system been available in the Company,
then one would have been strongly tempted to use i t to
bring about change. As i t was not there was no
alternative other than to use a total and direct
participation approach. As Coch and French found over
thirty years earlier, it proved to be most effective.
The key reasons, of course, for using a participative
approach were to minimise resistance to change and to
maximise commitment to the chosen solution. The
process was to involve public debate in small groups
with me and my colleagues generally facilitating and
stimulating ideas and discussion, but leading towards
a general solution. The real participation of all
employees was not in choosing the general solution,
but in adapting the original conceptual model to suit
their own circumstances. This process of adaptation
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was of great importance in gaining acceptance of the
new system, in overcoming resistance to change, and in
refreezing.
The case study did draw to my a t t en t ion two pre-
conditions which must exist if a major programme of OD
is to be carried out. Both existed at Company X.
F i r s t , there must e x i s t a cond i t ion within the
organization which causes sufficient discomfort to key
members for them to want to change.
Second, i t is v i t a l to obtain the whole-hearted
commitment of the uni t ' s chief executive to what is
proposed.
I have seen, and been involved in, other large scale
OD programmes which have not been so successful and I
now realise that a major reason for their failure was
that one or other of these pre-condit ions did not
exis t .
2.2 UNION INVOLVEMENT IN COUNCILS.
I t was not my i n t e n t i o n when the c o n s t i t u t i o n was
being derived to exclude people from union membership.
I t was my be l ie f tha t t h i s kind of soc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n
could operate equally well with or without i t and
examination of the Company X Constitution shows that
provision is made for i t . Further, in January 1978
Lord Brown strongly urged the Company's top management
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to encourage trade union membership at a l l levels and
in al l functions as a means of getting the TASS group
to accept and participate in the proposed system. The
Glacier model which Brown had experience of strongly
features several unions.
We wil l now proceed to examine whether in fact a l l
union, non-union or p a r t i a l union involvement in
policy making works councils makes a great deal of
difference. Before looking at this question we should
f i r s t acqua in t ou r se lves with some background
information about the nature and needs of companies,
and the sometimes conflicting needs of the people they
employ, in both cases taking into account the effects
of their environment.
2 . 2 . 1 THE NATURE OF COMPANIES AND FACTORS INVOLVED IN
MAKING THEM SUCCESSFUL.
The f i e l d s t u d y e x p l o r e s m a n a g e r i a l p r o b l e m s
experienced in a small part of an American-based
multi-national corporation. Very large, sophisti-
cated and d ivers i f ied firms of th is kind have
reached a position of dominance in al l the world's
technologically advanced market economies. Al-
though they share some s imi lar c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
with much smaller companies there are important
differences, and because multi-nationals in many
ways display what could be considered ul t imate
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characteristics of companies, and because the case
study is involved with one, we will concentrate
our attention on this form of company.
One thing which distinguishes these large business
firms from their smaller, more traditional
brethren is that they contain many distinct
operating units. Each unit has its own adminis-
trative office, its own full-time salaried
manager, and its own set of accounts which can be
audited separately from those of the larger
enterprise. Theoretically, each could operate as
an independent business enterprise. The tra-
ditional firm was a single unit enterprise, with
an individual or small number of owners operating
a shop, store or factory out of a single office.
Normally, this type of firm produced or sold a
single line of products, and operated in one
geographic area. The modern, multi-unit enter-
prise, in contrast, has come to operate in dif-
ferent locations, often carrying out a number of
economic activities, and producing or selling
several lines of goods or services. The activi-
ties of the small firm are controlled by market
and price mechanisms whereas in large finis,
business units are monitored and coordinate I :>y
the decisions of salaried managers at corporate
level and some processes, which would have b"en
directly subject to market pressures, are in tor
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nalised. A second sa l ien t cha rac te r i s t i c of the
large enterprise is that i t employs a large-scale
hierarchy of salaried managers and specialists.
Large business characterised by multiple operating
u n i t s , v a r i e d a c t i v i t i e s and manage r i a l
hierarchies are now at the heart of the leading
market economies; historically however, they are a
recent phenomenon. The hierarchical organization
typical of big business has had a long history in
the mil i tary and s ta te bureaucracies, but only
since the late nineteenth century has it been used
extensively to organize indust r ia l ac t iv i ty . I t
appeared with surprising suddenness. As late as
1840, there were no middle managers in the United
States and very few in Europe; that i s , almost no
salaried managers supervised the work of other
managers and, in tu rn , reported to senior
executives who were themselves salaried managers.
Nearly all top level managers were owners, either
p a r t n e r s or major s h a r e h o l d e r s in t h e i r
enterprises.
Large firms sprang up in large numbers f i r s t in
the United States with Europe lagging behind; by
the 1920's however, big business had become the
most inf luent ia l non-government ins t i tu t ion in
these countries.
The r i se of these large corporations was due to
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fundamental changes in processes of production and
distribution made possible by the availability of
new sources of energy and by the increasing appli-
cation of scientific knowledge to industrial
technology. They developed primarily in in-
dustries and sectors where advancing technology
permitted companies to provide goods and services
in high volumes to large, geographically dispersed
markets.
Industrial enterprises, which integrated mass
production with mass distribution, began to appear
in the United States in the 1880's in such indus-
tries as tobacco, flour, food and brewing, and
machinery produced by assembling interchangeable
parts. After the first World War many of these
large enterprises adopted a strategy of product
and geographic diversification, which in turn led
them to develop a multi-divisional structure
(rather than the earlier, functionally based and
more centralised form).
In this type of structure - pioneered by Du Pont
and General Motors in the early 1920's - divisions
are set up so that they are usually market based,
almost completely self-contained, and structured
so as not to compete with each other. The Head
Office formulates the enterprise's product-market
strategy leaving the divisions to determine the
strategies for given products/markets. Head
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Office allocates financial resources, controls
cash and critical support functions - in other
respects divisions are autonomous and can make
their own business decisions the results of which
can be monitored. At present it is the diversi-
fied, divisionalised type of company (often multi-
national) which has become so dominant, and which
has been shown to lead to superior economic
performance (Rumelt 1974). This form of organi-
zation features in the case study.
In Britain the large enterprise which was common
in the United States before World War I did not
become a major force in the economy until the
1920's and 1930's and then tended to take a
holding company form. Holding companies were
corporations created for the purpose of holding
stock in other incorporated enterprises. They,
too, controlled many operating units but limited
this to legal and financial aspects and did not
use administrative devices. In fact, a holding
company remained little more than a federation of
autonomous operating subsidiaries: although its
central office had the legal power to determine
policies for its operating units, to co-ordinate
and monitor their activities and to allocate
resources for future production, it could not do
so in practical terms as it lacked a corporate
staff to implement its decisions. Until this was
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done, formulations of policy and al locat ion of
resources usually resulted from informal agree-
ments among the consti tuent firms. Integrated
divisionalised structures were virtually unknown
in Britain unt i l after 1950, and in the ful lest
sense, there are s t i l l very few of them today.
What then are the ingredients that make large, and
par t icu lar ly diversif ied firms, more successful
than their smaller brethren. A major factor is
control.
Galbraith (1973) asserted that there is a tendency
for a l l producers, whether individuals or firms,
large or small, to seek to control their economic
environment and not be subject to i t . We see this
if we look at why individuals join trade unions -
'The individual often re jects the opportunity of
selling his services on the market and unites with
others to se l l through a union. The union thus
gains power over the common pr ice of such
services , and through the control of membership,
on occasion over supply1 ( j . K. Galbraith)
Although we have diverged a l i t t l e in looking at
the position of the individual in respect to the
market, s imilar thinking applies to companies.
The large firm that owns and operates a multi-unit
system, and that relies on a managerial hierarchy
to administer i t , is able to get better control of
i ts business units by internalising activi t ies and
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t ransact ions which for a separate , independent
bus iness would be very sub jec t to market
pressures . An element of th is is the be t te r way
administrative co-ordination of the units is able
to ensure a steady flow of funds - both cash and
investment funds. Various economies of scale can
be effected with respect to production, purchasing
and d i s t r ibu t ion ( th is is usually an important
competitive advantage in the kind of industr ies
involving big business); in diversified firms the
risks are more widely spread; as enterprises grow,
and as the number of execu t ives i n c r e a s e s ,
managers become more s p e c i a l i s e d and more
professional.
The a b i l i t y to deploy advanced technology is of
crucial importance to many of these firms. Big
business is l ike ly to have the edge over i t s
smaller brethren both in i t s a b i l i t y to generate
the investment funds needed for t h i s , and in
having avai lable the special ised manpower to
u t i l i s e i t . Of the various factors mentioned
here, technology and control may be the most
crucia l - we will return to the control aspect
la te r on.
Businesses, large or small, operate in a com-
pe t i t i ve environment and must seek competitive
advantage. In other words, they must gain a
sustainable edge over their competitors. We have
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seen that large businesses have certain competi-
tive advantages over smaller firms, however that
does not by any means eliminate the competition.
Crucial to a company striving for competitive
advantage is its strategic planning.
There are three main elements to be taken into
account in this connection: the Company itself,
and the Competition.
The Company must ensure that its strengths match
the needs of a clearly defined market and that it
can achieve superior performance, relative to the
competi t ion, in the market sec tor . If the
company's approach to the customer is identical to
that of the competition, the customer will be
unable to distinguish between their respective
offerings (in this situation price cutting is
l ikely with damaging effects upon prof i tab i l i ty
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and the long-term future of the company). A suc-
cessful strategy is one that ensures a better
matching of corporate strengths to customer needs
than is provided by competitors.
The company must analyse itself and decide how it
wants to compete and what it wants to offer, both
now and in the future. For instance, should it
stress product leadership or adopt a strategy of
following, using tried and trusted technology to
offer a particularly reliable product; or should
it offer a low volume, exclusive product at a high
price; or should it offer flexibility; or short
delivery; or reliable delivery; or above average
after sales service. These strategic choices will
influence a number of things including the calibre
of manpower needed, organization structure and the
technology employed.
Having developed a strategy and made plans it is
then equally important that the company is able to
carry them out. To reach its goals it will need
to organize and to ensure that it has an effective
command and control system.
One way of looking at organization is by stressing
that an individual working alone cannot usually
fulfil his needs, as this is understood in a
developed economy, as well as he could if he
cooperated with others. Underlying this concept
67
of organization is the idea of the coordination of
effort in the service of mutual help. Human
Societies have found that they can best achieve
their goals if they divide up among their members
the various tasks that need to be accomplished on
the basis of innate talents or skills.
Organization becomes more crit ical when we need to
utilize the modern technology that can be brought
to bear on products, and on the processes by which
they are made. Organization goes hand in hand
with technical advance and its employment requires
the shared knowledge of numerous specialists.*
The company then, needs to get work done but work
directed towards economic performance, objectives
and resul ts . For companies to be able to do this
some people must be able to influence others.
Power is needed (as well as formal authority) to
direct and control the executive system. The need
for influence and making decisions means that A
must be able to exercise legitimate authority over
B, and B over C, and so on down a hierarchy. A is
B's superior. B is expected to carry out the
instructions which should be within company policy
and the law. There is a presumption here that
* The subdivision of tasks to accord with the area of
knowledge is not confined to mechanical processes. It
occurs in medicine, building design, accounting and legal
p rac t i ces and every other problem that involves an
agglomerate of scientific knowledge.
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there is a shared sense of legitimacy between A
and B and that it rests on the willing compliance
of B.
Authority is an institutional mechanism intended
to define the relationships between individuals.
Leavitt (1964) provides an additional insight into
this. 'Authority is power that enters the two-
party relationship through the organization. It
is an institutional mechanism that aims to define
which of two members of a relationship, A or B,
will be the superior.'
He goes on 'Authority is potential extra power,
given by a third party to some of its members in
order to guarantee an unequal distribution of
power. Formal authority is a delegable kind of
power". A useful notion is to think of authority
as residing in the office and not the person.
It is in the nature of companies that they are
structured on hierarchical lines with an ultimate
dec is ion-maker (s) at the top who, if he needs to,
can overrule others lower down. This is the
Command structure. In a company the corporate
need is almost always given priority over that of
any individual working for it* due to its extreme
need to reach corporate goals. As Jaques observed
*In some societies, including some work organizations, the
individual can enjoy quite a high priority in relation to
the corporate body.
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(1951), an execut ive system is composed of
interconnected command groups, the subordinate in
one being the superior in their own command
group, with the exception of the bottom level.
Authority is an a t t r ibu te of a role which gives
the incumbent the right to exercise power. Power
itself - we could call it leadership ability - is
the quality of an individual which enables him to
influence other ind iv idua l s and groups by
channelling and directing their behaviour in such
a way as to help him ful f i l his aims. Power
attaches to the person and often hinges on the
concept of c red ib i l i t y which is again closely
linked to competence and the idea of sapient ia l
power. Sapiential power is a very useful form as
i t gives the ab i l i t y to cut right across the
organization chart and is not restricted to formal
channels. Additional to this is personal power
which manifests itself in charisma and leadership.
Power cannot, of course, be delegated and is the
energy that drives a company - formal authority is
only used when power breaks down.
The third part of execution is concerned with
control . Control may be broadly defined as the
process of measuring, evaluating and adjusting
system performance so that i t meets system goals*.
* The term system is being used here as 'a set of parts co-
ordinated to accomplish a set of goals' (Churchman, Systems
Approach, 1968.)
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It may take various forms: financial, budgetary,
production, inventory, qual i ty , manpower, and so
on. A major advantage of the divis ional ised
structure (compared with a functionally-based
organ iza t ion ) is tha t i t is poss ib le to se t
financial goals for the divisions and measure
their performance on a profit or loss basis. This
sharpens the goal orientation of the division and
gives a more rea l i s t ic measure of performance than
is possible in a functional department measuring
actual against budgetted expense with rather
negative connotations.
In organizing people to work i t must be a primary
aim to obtain their commitment to corporate goals
and to ensure tha t they give of t h e i r bes t .
Common p r i n c i p l e s of o rgan iza t ion used by
companies are those of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and
delegation backed with authority. They will seek
to create a s i tua t ion where everyone (including
managers) can be held accountable for the results
of the i r work and that of thei r department (if a
manager). Delegation and decentral izat ion are
s t ruc tu ra l concepts re la t ing to th is and are
concerned with the transfer of responsibility an]
authori ty for task performance to one or more
subordinates by a superior. When this is done
authority is in effect decentralized, or removed,
from the single central position i t once occupied.
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Continued decentralization has the effect of
transferring authority and responsibility to suc-
cessively lower levels of a hierarchy. When
designing these jobs, tasks must be allocated that
are feasible in terms of the individual's capa-
b i l i t y , as well as having adequate resources and
authority attached. All of this is important in
obtaining commitment.
There are various tools used by management to
ensure control of behaviour including supervision
(the span of control concept is important in this
connection), performance appraisal and management
by objectives (MBO). Participation is often used
to aid commitment although Odiorne (1979) asserts
that 'while part icipat ion is generally desirable
in goal setting and decision making its principal
merit l ies in social and po l i t i ca l values rather
than its effect on production.'
At the time of the i n d u s t r i a l revolut ion in
England, companies (although relatively small at
that time) changed from the ear l ie r putting-out
sys tem, which was r e a l l y a form of sub-
contracting, to a factory system. There were two
main reasons: f i r s t , the new technology of: the
time demanded c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and second, i t
permitted the owner of the business to exercise
t ighter control of his workforce. However, i t
also led to a greater emphasis eventually being
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placed on collectivism which usually expressed
itself in unionization.
To be in control, present day companies must have
the means of resolving conflicts between power
groups without there being much likelihood that
any of the parties will withdraw resources under
their control. Control is likely to be enhanced if
these industrial relations processes can be inter-
nalised, as at the very least , the outcomes will
be more predictable.
In summarizing, company effectiveness depends upon
a sound strategy that can be delivered. Delivery
requires goals to be identified, tasks to be
distributed among individuals, efforts to be
coordinated and controlled to ensure that goals
are reached.
Let us now turn to look at the needs of the
indiv iduals who work for companies, paying
p a r t i c u l a r a t t en t i on to p a r t i c i p a t i o n and
industrial democracy.
2.2.2 EMPLOYEE NEEDS
A fundamental question i s , 'How can organizational
p o l i c i e s or s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s be developed which
w i l l permit some reasonable matching of human
needs and organizational demands?"
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Industrial management is so organized that control
is from the top down, with responsibi l i ty and
authority delegated by the few to the many. The
control by those at the top is exerted through the
management organization through the formulation of
policies that set limits within which action may
be taken by the many. Top management policy is
aimed at the promotion of a profitable enterprise
and emphasises long range achievement. In
promoting a profitable enterprise, management is
l ikely to s t ress in i t s policy the necessity for
freedom of action, and to feel that without i t ,
control of the business is lost. In a managerial
hierarchy, those at the top who have the final
authority are usually the most capable.
Here we have a statement of the way companies are
viewed by investors, customers and suppliers but
the question of introducing employee participation
and industr ial democracy introduces a different
viewpoint to the ways companies should operate,
and possibly even to their purpose.
Managements, and the companies, need cooperation
from the workforce - cooperation being the shared
effort on the part of individuals and groups to
achieve jointly desired goals.
In pract ice, much of British industry is in a
s t a t e of con f l i c t between managements and
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workforces and this is exacerbated by collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining is essentially
a compe t i t i ve process and c h a r a c t e r i s e d by
conflict, whereas cooperation is characterised by
mutual aid .
In union organizations control is ultimately from
the bot tom upward, wi th a u t h o r i t y and
respons ib i l i t y delegated by the many to the few.
The many who control are usually less capable than
the leaders whom they control : the aims of the
rank and file are likely to be relatively opport-
unistic and short range.
When a union is fighting with management for i t s
e x i s t e n c e , union-management coopera t ion is
impossible. Its leaders are motivated primarily
to get more and more from management through
collective bargaining so that they will remain in
office and the workers will remain in the union.
When the union has achieved some form of security
(for instance, through a closed shop) i ts leaders
wil l no longer have to weigh every move in terms
of what their constituents will have to say about
i t . They can cooperate more in the long-term
i n t e r e s t although in doing so the rank and t i l e
will have lost control.
In the bulk of the managerial l i tera ture the t-rns
' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' and ' democracy ' a re used
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synonymously but r e a l l y they have d i f f e r e n t
meanings.
Pateman (1970) refers to democracy as being a
p o l i t i c a l method or se t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l
arrangements at national level. Schumpeter (1943)
sugges ts tha t the democrat ic method is the
competition for leadership. He compared the
poli t ical competition for votes to the operation
of the (economic) market; voters l ike consumers
choosing between po l ic ies (products) offered by
competing p o l i t i c i a n s . Eckstein (1966) had a
s imilar view seeing democracy as a p o l i t i c a l
system where elections decide the outcome of com-
petition for leadership.
In the context of a company there are perhaps two
points to be made about th is issue. F i r s t , the
democratic method tends to emphasise competition
and even conf l i c t , where the offerings are at
opposite ends of a scale (the daily happenings at
Westminster show that the job of the opposition is
to oppose the elected government almost i r r e -
spective of whether i t agrees with the govern-
ment's po l ic ies or not). A company will want to
stress common objectives and pulling together - in
other words cooperation. Second, the democratic
method s t resses the need for an opposition which
at times ru les . There can be no a l t e rna t ive
government in a company and thus the term demo
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cracy is false in that setting.
In a democratic structure participation is usually
restricted to voting for policies and leaders,
although in principle everyone is free to stand
for leadership. Elections are crucial to the
democratic method for it is primarily through
elections that the majority can exercise control
over their leaders. Responsiveness of leaders is
ensured primarily through the sanction of loss of
office at elections; the decisions of leaders can
also be influenced by active groups bringing
pressure to bear during inter-election periods.
Political equality in the theory refers to uni-
versal suffrage. In industry, closed shop
agreements may be advantageous to both company and
union, but they do reduce the degree of control
which can be exercised by an individual and they
reduce democracy.
Perhaps the most useful definition of partici-
pation is the very simple one given by the Oxford
Dictionary which says that 'to participate1 is 'to
share in'. This conveys the feeling of what is
involved.
In Western countries the concept of: the
corporation is not conducive to this pro-
participation idea for it sees the stockholders as
the owners of the corporation and the workforce as
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employed labour. It is easy for this concept to
become conflict oriented, with management acting
on behalf of the stockholders, and employees
reacting by turning to collectivism to maximise
their power and obtaining the services of a union
to represent them.
Ohmae (1982) tells us that the Japanese concept of
a corporation is fundamentally different from the
Western model. In Japanese eyes a corporation is
nothing but an assembly of people, each known as a
"sha-in", or member (not an employee), of the
corporation. The stockholders are a group of
interested moneylenders and like banks, they are
simply another source of capital, willing to
invest in the collective viability of the
corporation. Many Japanese chief executives, when
asked what they consider to be their main
responsibility, will say that they work for the
well-being of their people. Shareholders do not
rank much higher than bankers in their list of
priorities.
Ohmae does stress that the situation just
described is peculiar only to the older, larger
and more prestigious companies. It is not found
in smaller enterprises, which are seldom unionized
and tend to hire and fire as their overall
workload fluctuates. However, in this paper the
focus is provided by Company X which is part of
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one of the world's most prestigious multi-national
corporations so the Japanese system is relevant to
the discussion. At more detailed level it should
be noted that large Japanese companies feature
life-time employment, consensus decision-making
and internalised "Company" unions. These things,
and the group emphasis in their society, contri-
bute to people's attitudes.
What then should a Western-type corporation do,
without al terat ions to company law which might
affect who were "insiders" and who "outsiders", to
improve a t t i t u d e , morale and t rus t with the
company?
One technique which is used is participation. It
will be helpful to examine the evidence which can
be drawn from the academic l i te ra ture on the
subject with the aim of increasing our under-
standing and highlighting some of the pitfalls.
It is clear from the l i te ra ture that the term
"employee participation" has many meanings and
that it can take various forms, some of which seem
to be more effective than others. One way of
looking at participation is to divide it into
task-centred and power-centred forms as they have
rather different aims.
The task-centred approach has stemmed mainly from
the work of American academic behavioural
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scientists and one of i ts aims is to increase job
sat isfact ion. It is comparatively unstructured
and r e l i e s upon the informal involvement of
employees in the day-to-day decisions which affect
them in their jobs. It requires a part icipat ive
management style, which is receptive to the ideas
and suggestions of subordinates and is prepared to
involve them in routine decision-making. Dickson
(1981) described this form of participation as 'a
social technology employed by managers at their
discretion' .
On the other hand power-centred participation is
industrial relations oriented - quite a different
field in the l i t e r a t u r e . This usually aims at
increasing the bargaining power of the workers
within the enterprise and at making managerial
decision-makers more accountable ei ther to the
unions or to the workers.
These two forms may be classif ied another way.
The task-centred approach is d i rec t ; the power-
cen t r ed form must a lmost always involve
representatives and tends to be concerned with
wider issues - such as the government o£ the
enterprise.
Another useful distinction between these two Conns
is to view them, as Strauss and Rosenstein (1970)
d id , in terms of immediate and d i s t a n t
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participation. Immediate participation refers to
employee involvement in matters of immediate
concern to the performance of his job, whereas
dis tant p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e f e r s to employee
involvement in higher levels of organizational
decision-making which usually would fall within
the scope of top management and affects the
organization as a whole. This must involve the
use of representatives.
Using the framework of immediate and distant
participation we will proceed to examine research
evidence concerning the demand among employees for
participation. Much of the empirical evidence
appears to support the view that the desire of
rank and file people to participate is greater if
i t is directly connected with their job (i.e.
immediate) than if it is to do with more distant
aspects. Pateman (1970) points out that much data
from large scale empirical investigations into
political attitudes and behaviour, undertaken in
most Western countries over the past twenty or
thirty years, has revealed that the outstanding
characteristics of most citizens, more especially
those in the lower socio-economic status groups,
is a general lack of interest in polit ics and
poli t ical activity. Again the Bullock Report
stated 'The greatest enemy of participation is
said to be apathy'.
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This is supported if examination is made of
research into attendance figures for trade union
meetings. Roberts (1956), for instance, in the
early 1950's, estimated that in British industry
generally, the level of attendance among branch
memberships was usually between 3 per cent and 15
per cent, with a heavy concentration between 4 per
cent and 7 per cent. The figures for craftsmen
were higher although s t i l l a minority. In their
sample of workers Goldthorpe et al (1968) found a
similar low level of involvement in trade union
ac t i v i t i e s . Only 7 of 101 interviewed attended
trade union branch meetings on a regular basis. A
danger of basing a programme of part icipation on
this kind of representation is that it may result
in the active part icipation of a minority e l i t e
and non-participation of an apathetic rank and
file.
In evaluat ing the des i re for p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,
perhaps i t is necessary to distinguish between
groups of workers and types of dec is ions .
Goldthorpe et al asked their respondents whether
they agreed more with the view that 'unions should
just be concerned with getting higher pay and
better conditions' or that 'unions should also try
to get workers a say in management1. Of the
interviewed craftsmen 61 per cent agreed more with
the l a t t e r view, in contrast to 22 per cent of
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process workers and 28 per cent of assembly
workers, suggesting that the desire for pa r t i c i -
pation is related to the type of worker involved.
Holter (1965), conducting a study in Norway,
indicated a limited commitment by workers to
certain areas of decision making. She found that,
although there was a widespread, but perhaps vague
desire for more participation in decisions about
the firm, re la t ively few felt a need to include
decisions at top management level. Yet Holter did
find a desire for part icipation concerning the
worker's own jobs and immediate work environment.
Again Harris (1975) carried out a survey of 2083
employees in medium and large firms. This showed
26 per cent of employees (in the private sector)
requiring more information from the top on what
was happening and why, and 19 per cent to having a
bigger say in the day to day running of the com-
pany; only 3 per cent required workers to have a
seat on the board. The survey concluded " . . . they
want a bigger say in the everyday running of the
company, par t icular ly as i t affects themselves1.
Distant p a r t i c i p a t i o n has for the most part
resulted from government legislat ion and been
based around political ideals. This suggests that
workers should have a greater say in decision
making at work as a means of extending democracy
83
from the p o l i t i c a l to the i n d u s t r i a l sphere. Is
is strongly expressed in the intention behind both
the Draft Fifth Directive of the Commission of the
EEC and in the Draft S t a t u t e for a European
Company
'those who wi l l be s u b s t a n t i a l l y affected by
d e c i s i o n s made by s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l
ins t i tu t ions must be involved in the making of
those decisions'
And again regarding the nature of enterprises
'employees are i n c r e a s i n g l y seen to have
i n t e r e s t s in the f u n c t i o n i n g of the
e n t e r p r i s e s which can be as s u b s t a n t i a l as
those of shareholders, and sometimes more so'
S tud i e s of worker ' s r e sponses to systems of
dis tant part icipation that have been implemented
have mixed r e s u l t s . For ins tance , Millar (1979)
after researching the two-tier board system incor-
porating worker d i r e c t o r s in West Germany says
t h a t they have l i t t l e i n f luence on employee
at t i tudes probably due to i t s distance from them.
She reports favourably on their factory-site-basod
works councils which she says helps in creating an
atmosphere of harmony. Clarke e t al (1972) also
report a lack of interest among the rank and fi le
with respect to board representation. Studies by
Kolaja (1965), Kavcic et al (1971), Broeckmeyer
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( 1 9 6 8 ) and Rus (1970) have a l l been c r i t i c a l of
the degree of real part icipation actually achieved
by the e labora te systems of worker's council in
Yugoslavia. Despite often being cal led "self-
management" they say councils at best only approve
management i n i t i a t i ves . In Britain this would be
known as j o in t consu l ta t ion . Emery and Thorsrud
(1969) looked at Worker representatives on company
boards of d i r e c t o r s in five Norwegian organiza-
tions and found that these individuals only played
a minor role in decision making and that the
extent to which they were represen ta t ive was
quest ionable since there was l i t t l e evidence of
feedback and c o m m u n i c a t i o n wi th t h e i r
consti tuents .
Empirical evidence with respect to immediate
p a r t i c i p a t i o n is general ly more favourable both
with regard to the d e s i r e for i t and in i t s
e f f ec t s . Holter (1965), as mentioned e a r l i e r ,
analysed responses from 591 b lue -co l l a r and 397
white-collar non-supervisory employees drawn from
eighteen Norwegian organiza t ions . In answer to
questions concerning changes within the firm, it
was found that 'more cooperation with management'
ranked f i r s t on a l i s t of ten a l t e r n a t i v e s Lor
blue-collar workers and was second most important
for whi te -co l l a r employees. In response to a
second item, Holter found that 78 per cent of
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b l u e - c o l l a r and 59 per cent of w h i t e - c o l l a r
respondents felt that employees in general did not
' p a r t i c i p a t e s u f f i c i e n t l y in dec i s ions tha t
concern the management of the establishment as a
whole1. These figures are made more relevant to
our proposition when we look at their responses to
another item on which respondents indicated
whether: (1) they did not want increased
participation; (2) they wanted more participation
in decisions that directly affected their own job;
or (3) they wanted to par t ic ipa te more in de-
cisions concerning the whole establishment. 56
and 67 per cent of the blue and white-collar
respondents, respectively, endorsed the second
a l t e rna t ive , wanting more par t ic ipat ion in de-
cisions which directly affect their own work.
Similar findings from a sample of Brit ish male
blue-collar industrial workers have been reported
by Hespe and Warr (1971). They asked 243 indi-
viduals if they would like to have more influence
in the running of their departments than they
currently had, and 61 per cent responded in the
affirmative. Hilgendorf and Irving (1970) studied
the a t t i tudes of over two thousand British Rail
employees and found that 58 per cent wanted more
say in the way in which their work was carried
out.
Two investigations conducted in the United States
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add to the general picture. Katz (1954) found
that almost two-thirds of a sample of nearly 6000
workers in a single industrial firm reported that
they had insufficient influence over decisions
concerning how their own jobs were to be carried
out. Slightly over half wanted to part icipate
more. Morse (1953) reported that 70 per cent of
the c ler ical workers in an insurance company
indicated that they would like to be more involved
in decisions on their own jobs.
The evidence provided by Wall and Lischeron
(1977), who conducted empirical investigations
over a period of five years into the at t i tudes
towards participation of such diverse groups of
workers as nurses, skilled and unskilled blue-
collar industrial workers, and local authority
employees, found a preference for direct rather
than indirect procedures. Participation through
personal interaction with management was the
choice of the large majority of nurses and
industrial workers and of most local authority
workers. The r e l a t i v e lack of support £or
participation based on trade union representation
was noted. Wall and Lischeron commented that
among nurses this may be expected but for blue-
collar workers (those in the sample were all union
members and active) i t was unpredictable. They
attributed this to the idea that to most of these
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workers, pay, security and disciplinary issues
defined the normal l imits of the shop steward's
and t r a d e union ' s a c t i v i t i e s while for
participation in other areas they looked for other
forms of involvement.
Considering the heterogeneous nature of the
investigations the findings are reasonably con-
s i s ten t . They show that the majority of respon-
dents in each study want more participation, with
direct forms being preferred. They also show, and
this is important, that not a l l people want to
participate more.
The bulk of research has been directed towards
establishing a link between participation and job
satisfaction and most commentators have concluded
that available evidence shows participation to be
an important determinent of job satisfaction. In
the influential writings of Argyris (1957, 1962,
1964), Likert (1961, 1967) Bennis (1966) and
McGregor (1960, 1967) this assumption is strongly
evident. Much of the evidence cited in support of
the participation-satisfaction thesis comes from
studies of leadership. Typically, investigators
have looked for differences in leadership style
across different s i tuat ions and examined the
relationship between style and people's attitudes
and behaviours.
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Before leaving this review of participation there
are two industrial relations issues which should
be looked a t . Fox (1968) provides an in te res t ing
perspective on power and task-centred forms of
pa r t i c i pa t i on by posing the quest ion, "Is an
indus t r i a l en te rpr i se a unitary or p l u r a l i s t i c
s t ruc tu re" . He argues that a unitary system has
one source of authority, one focus of loyalty and
he suggests i t be treated as a team. The patterns
of behaviour expected of a success fu l and
healthily functioning team are that - members
s t r ive j o in t l y towards a common objec t ive , each
pull ing his weight to the best of his a b i l i t y
each accepts his place and functions gladly ,
following the leadership of the one appointed
there are no oppositionary groups or factions,
and therefore no rival leaders in the team
the members of the team have obl igat ions of
l o y a l t y t o w a r d s the l e a d e r which i s
reciprocated.
Fox is c r i t i c a l of t h i s view, which he considers
is a v i s i on of what many employers and top
managers think industry should be l ike . Rather,
he recommends t h a t the firm be viewed as a
p lura l i s t i c structure or a coalition of interests .
The trade union's role in the workplace is not
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that of an invader of a private realm, but that of
an ins t i tu t ional i sed expression of sec t iona l
d iv i s ions already ex i s t ing within i t . In
recognising union rights and freedom Fox maintains
we are doing no more than accept ing, in the
industr ial sphere, the expression of the basic
principles of our society.
He highlights here a dilemma facing a company
which i t most overcome if i t is to operate
competitively. This dilemma is how to avoid
conf l ic t -based r e l a t i o n s in a p l u r a l i s t i c
structure. Purcell 's model (1981) of degrees of
order and disorder and formalizat ion in an
industrial relations system does perhaps provide
an answer if we look, at the right hand end
disorder order
low formalization high formalization
i r~ i 1 i
Ad hoc Ad hoc Basic pro- Forum Written
meetings meetings cedural rule backed by consti-
at shop floor minuted for grievances procedure. tution.
and factory & disputes Limited Extensive
level. agenda. substan-
Outcomes tive
unrecorded rules for
joint
d<j n.'oments
of the continuum. He calls this condition "Co-
operative Constitutionalism". An advantage of
cooperative constitutionalism - which features an
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elaborate written constitution - is the particular
effort made by the part ies to abide by the consti-
tution, once it is well established, which is seen
to set-up mutual rights and obligations which
should not be breached. Purcell also stresses
that in time these meetings will enable a climate
of trust to be developed between the parties which
' is clearly required if there are to be good
industrial relations'. This kind of structure was
employed in Company X.
2 . 2 . 3 ENVIRONMENT.
It is self-evident that firms operate within an
environment and as open systems will be affected
by i t (in the case of mult i -s i te companies and
multi-nationals there will be several different
environments). The term "environment" embraces a
number of things, but of particular relevance to a
firm's structure and management practice are two
sub-groups: market/technological environment and
social environment. Let us examine each of these
in turn.
Market/Technological Environment.
This is defined by the type of product or service
which an organizat ion provides, the type of
customer i t serves, and the industry of which is
is a part. Joan Woodward's influential South-East
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Essex study in the 1950's (1965), has led to much
further research into the impact on companies of
the i r environment (Galbraith 1977, Goggin 1974,
Burns and Stalker 1966, e tc . ) / with p a r t i c u l a r
emphasis on market and technological aspects by
the above. The l i t e r a t u r e focusses on four
environmental character is t ics .
Stabil i ty: A company's environment can range from
stable to dynamic. A variety of factors can make
an environment dynamic including unstable gover-
nments, unpredictable sh i f t s in the economy,
customer demands for creat ivi ty or novelty, and a
rapidly changing technology. In general, the more
dynamic the environment, the more organic the
s t r u c t u r e . In a s tab le s i t u a t i o n , a company can
b e t t e r p r e d i c t i t s future c o n d i t i o n s and
standardise i t s ac t iv i t i e s .
Complexity: A firm's environment can range from
simple to complex. The more complex the
environment, the more decentralized the structure.
Product and Market Diversity: A company's markets
can range from i n t e g r a t e d to d i v e r s i f i e d .
D i v e r s i t y may r e s u l t from a broad range of
products, or from geographic diversity, or from a
combinat ion of these two t h i n g s . The more
d i v e r s i f i e d the company, the g r e a t e r the
propensity to s p l i t i t into market-based uni t s .
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The Harvard mul t i -na t ional en terpr i se research
programme has shown q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n b r e e d s d i v i s i o n a l i s a t i o n
( S t o p f o r d , 1968) , and, as Goggin (1974)
demonstrated, an extreme case of simultaneous area
and product d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , can lead on to
complex matrix structures.
As the complexity and d ivers i ty of company goals
increases , then so wil l the amount of knowledge
needed, the amount of information to be processed,
and the degree of uncertainty be increased. Fewer
decisions can be routinized and more exceptions
a r i s e which must be r e f e r r ed upward in the
h i e r a r chy . As more except ions are r e fe r r ed
upward, the hierarchy will become overloaded and
serious delays wil l develop. In this s i tua t ion
new organizational forms must develop.
With the quant i t a t ive and qua l i t a t ive change in
information to be processed i t becomes efficient
to bring the points of decision making down to the
po in t s of ac t ion where the informat ion and
expert ise e x i s t s . This process i s , of course,
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , and i s accomplished by
increasing the amount of discretion exercised at
lower h ie rarch ica l l eve ls . Increased delegation
does face top management with a problem of co-
ordinat ion and cont ro l , and wil l require higher
capacity people at low organizational levels.
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The fourth environmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s
host i l i ty. Extreme hosti l i ty in i ts environment
drives a company to cen t ra l i se i t s s t ructure
whi l s t i t is being endured. The causes of
h o s t i l i t y might be such th ings as extreme
competition, or re la t ionships with unions or
governments, and the rationale for centralization
is the need for fast reaction.
Social Environment
Although in the majority of firms the greatest
environmental impact will be fel t through the
market and technology, in the field study i t was
the socio-political aspect which was so important.
The social environment in which a firm operates
a f fec t s i t d i r e c t l y through l e g i s l a t i o n and
government regulat ions, and indi rec t ly , through
the expectations and values of i t s employees.
However, the socia l , p o l i t i c a l and leg is la t ive
factors are closely intertwined with the economic
system also making an impact. Let us explore some
examples.
We mentioned earlier how company law in different
countries affects the concept of the corporation,
where the Western model ses the shareholders as
the owners of the corporation and the workforce as
employed labour. In contrast, in Japanese eyes a
corporation is nothing but an assembly of people,
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each known as a "sha-in", or member. The share-
holders are a group of wealthy and interested
moneylenders, and like banks, are simply another
source of capital. This concept affects the
social climate (Ohmae, 1982).
Various writers (Yoshino 1973, Dore 1973, Ohmae
1982) have stressed the group nature of Japanese
society starting in the education system which
emphasises group harmony very strongly and
creating a people with a unified value system.
Western upbringing, in contrast, lays a much
heavier emphasis on individualism. In the West,
people are taught to state their views and defend
their individual rights uncompromisingly and worry
little about the effects of these values on social
harmony. In Japan, Ohmae asserts, gifted children
are taught to use their extra margin of intel-
ligence to help-out slow moving classmates instead
of, as in the West, to advance faster than the
others. This attitude is carried over into the
work situation.
Japanese work organizations exhibit many group
characteristics and executive work is oriented
towards the group rather than the indivi •ii.ial.
According to Dore (1973), tasks are assigned to,
and performed by, a group rather than by indi-
viduals and responsibility is shared by the group.
Dore shows Japanese management organisation as
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fitting into a pyramid arrangement of teams.
There is more informal participation than is
common in the West. The decision making process
known as the ringi system gives everyone concerned
a chance to participate in making proposals and
help in arriving at an ultimate decision. This
causes delays but its strength is that once a
decision is taken everyone understands and is in
accord.
The changing values of Swedish workers fostered by
higher levels of education and social legislation
influenced Volvo's decision to experiment with
more attractive and interesting alternatives to
assembly line jobs (Gyllenhammar, 1977).
Labour legislation is another factor leading to
differences between countries. In the United
States, The Labor Management Relations Act 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act), which governs who may and may
not be a member of a labour organization, ex-
pressly excludes from the definition of "employee"
any individual employed as a supervisor. A case
in 1974 is mentioned by Smith et al (1974) which
also excludes managerial employees (those who are
in a position to formulate and give effect to
managerial policies) even though they may neither
by supervising people nor be persons involved with
labour relations policies. The effect of this is
96
s imi lar to the typical company union found in
Japan, where those classified as "managerial" (10
per cent at the Furusato plant of Hitachi) are
excluded from union membership. In B r i t a i n
everyone, a t every l e v e l , i s e n t i t l e d to be
represented.
The German Co-determination model is probably the
best known example of a l e g a l i s t i c approach to
ensuring that there is employee participation in
companies. Mitbestimmung (Co-determination) is
character ised by involvement in a supervisory
board. The two t ier board system for German joint
stock companies is not new and has i ts origins in
nineteenth century company law (Tilden, 1974).
Under th i s law the annual general meeting of
sha reho lde r s e l e c t s the superv isory board
(Aufsichstrat) who in turn appoint the management
board (Vorstand). The supervisory board i s , as
the name implies, a supervisory body. I ts main
function is to supervise the way the management
board conducts the bus ines s . I t i s not the
intent ion that the supervisory board in any way
runs the company ona day to day basis - only to
watch over i t . Under Mitbestimmung the super-
visory board consis ts of equal numbers of people
chosen by the shareholders meeting and represen-
tatives of the employees.
Adams and Rummel (1976) consider that a major
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benefit of this institutional form* accrues from
"continual contact and exposure to issues of
common concern to representatives of labour and
management who have come to trust and cooperate
with each other to a much greater extent than was
once thought possible'.
In contrast, in Britain there is a system of
counterveiling power rather than consensus. This
tends to permeate the entire Society - including
the industrial society - and i t could be post-
ulated that it stems from the two party political
system, with a government, and an opposition whose
major role is to oppose.
In the Company X study i t was hypothesised that
the company's environment was a major cause of its
internal difficulties. The pro-union climate in
England in 1977, and the existence of recognition
disputes like Grunwick, affected the expectations
and values of Company X employees making i t
necessary to bring structure and processes into
line.
* An important additional element is the works council
which deals with more local issues. By law councils
(composed exclusively of representatives of employees) are
expected to work together with managemnet so that decisions
will be taken which benefit both employees and company.
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2.2.4 THE CONSTITUTION; MANIFEST, ASSUMED AND EXTANT
SITUATIONS.
To avoid confusion we will distinguish between
three different organizational situations which
may exist: the manifest, the assumed and the
extant. The manifest is the situation as it is
formally described and displayed. The assumed is
the situation as it is assumed to be by
individuals and groups involved. The extant is
the real situation as revealed by systematic
exploration and analysis: often it can never be
known. Ideally, the manifest, assumed and extant
should be the same. In practice there may be
differences.
Examination of the Company X Constitution, which
provides the manifest situation, shows that under
it management and employees enjoy both rights and
duties. In intention it reveals a corporatist
stance to labour relations. 'The management and
employees of Company X have a common object to
ensure the continued success of the operations of
the company in the development, manufacture and
marketing of its products and in ensuring the
efficiency of those operations in the interests of
employees, shareholders and customers'. The sub-
jugation of individual objectives to corporate
objectives is a key issue in most OD programmes
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and, as the literature survey shows, is generally
an intention of employee participation.
Manifestly the Company X Constitution reveals a
trade-off between the rights of management and the
power of employees when i t says 'Management must
possess authority to make decisions about the
operation of the company. The bounds of that
authority, however, are limited by policies set
out by the pa ren t company on behal f of
shareholders, policies negotiated in the contracts
with customers and p o l i c i e s agreed between
management and employees. Thus management must
recognise the power of employees to set limits to
the extent of management decision making authority
while employees recognise that within those limits
management has the au thor i ty . . . to make...
decisions'.
This is an important statement that goes to the
heart of this social ins t i tu t ion . Management is
apparently gaining more control by means o£ the
ins t i tu t ion than i t would commonly have without
i t . Examination of the agreed policy which
enables managers to assess the work performance of
their hourly and weekly paid subordinates and to
reward them accordingly demonstrates that control
has been increased. This authority is now ran-Ly
found at this level in British industry whore
collectivism imposes a common rate of pay for a
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p a r t i c u l a r group, and in doing so, reduces
managerial control.
If one takes the view that management, in more
conventional c i rcumstances , has unbridled
authority, then employees are also gaining control
by setting limits on managerial authority and then
agreeing to allow managers to exerc ise that
authority within the agreed l imi t s . This is the
legitimizing process referred to ea r l i e r . Also
this argument confirms Tannenbaum's assert ion
(1968,81) tha t p a r t i c i p a t i o n increases to ta l
control throughout the system.
Information was gained in the feedback programme
that not only manifestly had management enhanced
i t s authority under the const i tu t ion, but also
extantly.
The const i tut ion grants further r ights and more
control to employees, by recognising that changes
cannot be made to existing policies which affect
employees without the agreement of those affected.
Thus, at least manifestly, a major issue which
would be likely to have effects on employees, mast
be brought before council. The majority of people
assumed it would and trusted their management to
do so. One individual had strong doubts. The
extant s i tuat ion cannot be known until such a
condition ar ises but th is point will be pursued
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later on.
Other rights conferred on individuals under the
constitution are those of representation and to
participate in an annual election procedure, and
'right of individual appeal to higher authority
against his manager's decision if it is felt to be
unfair or unjust to the individual and not in
keeping with the terms and spirit of agreed
policies.' An appeals procedure cannot be satis-
factorily operated without written policies, pro-
cedures and standing orders - these appear to be
gradually being derived. Representation,
elections and the appeals procedure are all in
operation.
Despite employees leaving the union, trade union
representation is built into the Constitution.
'If the majority of members of a department vote a
union member as their representative and that
representative wants an official of the union to
assist him in discussion with management, the
management will meet that official1. However,
manifestly the negotiating procedure is decen-
tralized to within the company. 'Management wiLL
refrain from agreeing changes with trade union
officials without the elected representatives of
employees who may be affected1. This statement LS
also at the core of this institution which aims at
localising issues.
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Pateman (1970) def ined f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n taking
place 'Where two or more p a r t i e s in f luence each
o the r in making d e c i s i o n s and where a dec i s i on
cannot be taken wi thout the agreement of both
p a r t i e s ' . This implies that the pa r t i e s involved
in the d e c i s i o n making have equa l power to
determine the outcome.
Under the Company X C o n s t i t u t i o n the manifes t
s i t u a t i o n is t h a t the power of a l l groups i s
equa l i s ed by the mechanism of unanimous vo t ing .
Any counc i l member can s top any proposal for a
change which i s u n a c c e p t a b l e by v e t o i n g i t .
Modi f i ca t ions must then be made to the change
proposa l u n t i l i t is accep tab le to a l l - u n t i l
that occurs the s ta tus quo preva i l s . The feedback
programme demonstra ted t h a t t h i s power d i s t r i -
bution was assumed by a l l except one interviewee.
Ear l ier in th i s analysis we examined the place of
a u t h o r i t y and power in f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e
f u n c t i o n i n g of m a n a g e r i a l h i e r a r c h i e s in
c o m p a n i e s . All of t h i s i s f a i r l y e a s i l y
understood when viewed in terms of an execu t ive
system; but a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system is s e p a r a t e
from t h i s and r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t form of
leadership. Bales c l a s s i c work (1950) ident i f ied
two separate types of leader: the task leader and
the social leader. The representa t ive f a l l s into
the l a t t e r c a t e g o r y . His r o l e c o n s i s t s of
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understanding the common needs and aspirations of
his constituents and helping them to crystal l ize
group consensus. The power of any association or
constituency wil l depend in part on the strength
of consensus among i t s members, and the strength
of t h e i r w i l l to remain united around tha t
consensus . The o ther pa r t of i t s power, and
probably the l a r g e r p a r t , de r ive s from the
importance of the associat ion to the other power
group or groups with which i t is negotiating. In
the f inal ana lys i s , the threat of withdrawal is
one of the prime sources of the power of
negotiating groups - always provided that what is
being withdrawn from the exchange cannot be
replaced.
At Company X in 1977, the leader of the TASS group
provided them with effect ive leadership which
enabled her to influence other individuals by
channelling and directing their behaviour in such
a way as to help her fu l f i l her aims. A strong
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e may behave as though he wore
expressing the views of his constituents while in
fact he may be pursuing e i ther his own aims or
those which he believes his constituents ought to
be pursuing.
It should be understood that the representative's
power base is his cons t i t uency and tha t a l l
members of an a s s o c i a t i o n (which is what a
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constituency is) are equal in the sense of having
the same r igh t s and none has formal author i ty to
i n s t r u c t any o t h e r s to do any th ing . The
represen ta t ive is elected into office by his
constituents and accountable to them. To lead in
these circumstances requires considerable ski l l as
we l l as s t r o n g p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
Leadership is ultimately a matter of matching up
the personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the leader with
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the group being led, the
nature of the task, and the situation surrounding
the task. Factors such as historical and changing
circumstances must be taken into account.
A s s o c i a t i o n s of people , whether they be a
professional body or a trade union, unite to
increase their power. They often seek to increase
t h e i r power base by a t t e m p t i n g to c o n t r o l
membership and on occasion supply. The closed
shop principle can aid th i s .
This leads on to the concept of withdrawal power.
Withdrawal power is connected with the idea of
having the a b i l i t y to close down the company (or
whatever other type of organizat ion) by with-
drawing the resources cont ro l led . It is t ied to
the economic concepts of scarcity and of monopoly.
In the case of a top management group (as at
Company X) i t has the a b i l i t y to close down the
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company, with the agreement of i t s parent, by
withdrawing financial or other resources. Or more
simply by transferring the business elsewhere.
The question may be posed whether any other power
group(s) also has th i s power source. A group of
employees (or an individual) with sufficient know-
how, information or expert ise which is v i t a l to
Company X's operation may also have i t but only
provided that this know-how, information or exper-
tise cannot be substituted. Low skil l workers are
usually eas i ly replaced and can only increase
their power by banding together with others, on a
broad geographic bas is , so that if they withdraw
their labour i t will not be replaced. Without
unionization, which has the potent ia l to give
people control over supply of their labour, and i t
may be added, without strong leadership and a
strong consensus, this is not possible.
Analysing the power structure at Company X in 1981
one finds tha t man i f e s t l y , according to the
cons t i tu t ion , the unanimous voting pr inciple
ensures that the power of the various groups is
equal. Looked at in physical science terms ill
the p a r t i e s have equal p o t e n t i a l energy L . • ?.
energy possessed by a body by v i r t u e oE i t s
position. In social science terms they have equal
power attached to the i r role i .e. author i ty . The
question at Company X of whether the parties have
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equal kinetic energy i.e. realisable power, hinges
on leadership, consensus and withdrawal power.
This analysis leads to the conjecture that the
quality of policy-making councils will be enhanced
if all power groups have equal potential and
realisable power, which is provided not just by
the Constitution, but also by having effective
withdrawal power.
2.2.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONS.
Whilst it is possible to argue that the quality of
policy-making councils will be enhanced if all the
power groups involved have equal potential and
realisable power, I believe that this concept is
both unrealistic and not in keeping with the
purpose of this kind of institution.
The reason why it is unrealistic is that as power
is constantly shifting it is not possible to
maintain a state of equilibrium over long periods
of time. Realisable power is dependant on at
least three things. First there is withdrawal
power. The reality of this form of power is that
top management can usually command it by
withdrawing the resources they control. However,
other employment groups only have it if their
commodity (labour) can be withdrawn without
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subst i tut ion being possible, and this depends
either on their sk i l l s being in short supply, or
on a foolproof closed shop agreement - the lat ter
depending on union involvement. In practice, and
in the long term, top management's withdrawal
power is likely to be stronger than that of other
groups.
The second main factor, leadership power, will
shift as those individuals filling representative
roles change over long periods. In the Company X
case most of the leading figures in the situation
changed over the four year period under review.
Third, environmental conditions change affecting
attitudes within the company.
The concept of power equa l i ty as a primary
objec t ive of the i n s t i t u t i o n is not only
unattainable but also is not a charac ter is t ic to
be stressed, as it suggests a conflict orientation
in labour relations and embodies the institutiona-
lization of capital/labour conflict. In contrast,
the underlying philosophy behind this kind of
const i tut ion is one of cooperation and common
purpose. It aims to bring about an a t t i tud ina l
change in both employees and employers from the
kind of confl ict orientat ion found in British
political and labour relations and exacerbated by
the idea of an opposition which must always oppose
at a political level, and collective bargaining in
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the industrial arena. However, it is not intended
to imply that in companies where this kind of
constitution operates there is complete harmony
between power groups but rather that consensus is
needed .
Cyert and March (1963) and March and Simon (1958),
in their highly influential studies of how organi-
zations set goals and make decisions, reached the
conclusion that an organization is, in reality, a
complex coalition of individuals and groups with
diverse goals, needs, desires and ta lents . In
order to understand goal setting and decision
making they put forward the view that there must
be recognition that there exists within organ-
izations a process of continuous bargaining. In
this coalition members use various forms, of what
could be called side payments, to induce others to
join them in pursuit of their particular goals.
For example, management attempts to induce invest-
ments by offering good dividends on shares of
stock. Similarly, management offers such things as
money, status and authority to induce employees to
join and work for them. Simon's concept o£ the
manager as one who reaches workable decisions i.e.
satisfices rather than maximises is an important
concept (Simon 1960). The goal setting process
can be seen as one of bargaining.
This concept l ies behind the Constitution which
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has built into it mechanisms to allow bargaining
between groups. Lord Scarman cited a lack of
properly developed industrial relations policy as
being a cause of the troubles at Grunwick, and
'procedural disarray1 was found by the Donovan
Commission to be a major cause of industrial
stri £e.
Perhaps more importantly a constitution of the
kind under consideration provides an example of a
'side payment1 made by top management to other
employees to join them. It would appear evident
that if companies expect their employees to be
committed and flexible for the sake of
organizational effectiveness it is in effect
asking them to be morally involved in the enter-
prise and to be committed to corporate goals. If
a company expects this kind of commitment, it must
for its part provide reward and conditions
consistent with such involvement.
Cadbury (1983), when interviewed about the forms
of representative participation which have been
used for a long time in his company (Cadbury
Schweppes) gives a feeling for how this can aid
cooperation when he replied to a question about
the long time it may take to gain acceptance for a
change proposal. He said, 'We spent longer than
we might otherwise on the preliminary stages of
involving people and discussing the steps to be
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t aken - bu t s p e n t a ve ry s h o r t t ime in
implementing. So we did not expand the span of
decision making we altered the constituent parts.
The other way around we would have made a very
quick decision at the board level and we would
have had one enormous hassle at the implementation
leve1 ' .
This concept is consistent with Revans (1982) view
when he defines management as embracing both the
s e t t i n g of a goal and the man ipu la t ion of
resources to achieve i t . He points out that a
person who se t s goals but makes no ef for t (or is
not effective) in achieving them is not a manager.
An advantage of cons t i t u t i ona l councils is that
they can be viewed in d i f f e r e n t ways by the
various parties - an important point in industrial
r e l a t i o n s . Management can see a cons t i tu t ion as
giving them better control: blue-collar workers
may see i t as introducing a form of i n d u s t r i a l
democracy into the firm.
Various w r i t e r s agree t ha t one of the major
benef i ts accruing to pa r t i c ipa t i on is that i t
provides the opportunity for the exercise of
influence among those to whom i t is important.
Mitchell (1973) has maintained that 'participation
wil l increase the l ikel ihood that the employee
w i l l g e t what he w a n t s ' . The e c o n o m i s t
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J .K. G a l b r a i t h (1967) o u t l i n e s h i s t h e o r y of
mot iva t ion by suggest ing tha t there are four ways
i t can be brought out
by compulsion
by purchase
by identification (with the group or firm)
by adaptation or influence.
This latter point, adaptation, is concerned with
the ability of the individual to make the goals of
the organization accord more closely to his own -
whether this is perceived or actual may not be so
important.
Barnard (1939) defines an organization as 'a
system of consciously coordinated activities or
forces of two or more persons'. Galbraith main-
tains in this connection that the important word
is coordination. 'It means that the participating
individuals are persuaded to set aside their indi-
vidual purposes or goals and pursue those of the
organization. All having done so, all work to
common goals. They are coordinated. Motivation
is the means or inducement by which such coordi-
nation is effected1.
If it is attitudinal change we are aiming for then
various writers have recognised trust, and its
opposite of mistrust, suspicion, anxiety and
alienation as being an important element. Barnes
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(1981) had this to say, 'Even though many managers
might agree that t rust in an organization is more
important to i t s functioning than, say, authority
and power, i t seems that organizat ional t rus t is
not always easy to develop 1 . Again Purce l l
(1981), 'Trust between the pa r t i e s is c lear ly
requi red for the re to be good i n d u s t r i a l
r e l a t i ons . Similarly mistrust and antagonis t ic
behaviour is p r eva l en t in cond i t i ons of bad
industrial relat ions ' . To quote Douglas McGregor
(1960) 'If we learn how to r ea l i se the potent ia l
for collaboration inherent in the human resources
of industry, we wil l provide a model for govern-
ment and nations mankind sorely needs.
Atti tude may be affected by a number of things.
It can be affected by the very concept of company
and how th i s is communicated by top management.
We have seen e a r l i e r that in the large Japanese
companies "members" of the company are seen to be
the people working for i t , whilst investors are
seen as another outside i n t e r e s t . At Glacier
Metal employees were always re fe r red to as
"members" (Brown 1960). More recently in Britain,
at BL the chief executive heavily stressed the
importance of the business a t t r ac t ing external
investment and Laid emphasis on the part employes
were to play in generating confidence (Edwardes
1983). We a l so mentioned e a r l i e r tha t KKC
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thinking follows t h i s l ine with respect to
"insiders" and "outsiders" and may in time result
in changes in company law. Certainly the way i t
is usually t reated in Western countr ies the
capita1-1abour model of corporation has the
potential to be conflict oriented and very often
is .
In continental Europe works councils and co-
operative committees are much in evidence (Berry
1974). The t i t le of the latter provides a clue as
to the nature of many of these, however, the
evidence seems to show that they do help to change
the climate of industrial relations from confron-
tation (as in much of Britain) to a more cor-
poratist stance. For instance, the classic German
works council is not a confrontation body or,
indeed, a joint body in any way. It provides a
forum for discussion but does not have any real
decision making power - nor is i t a negotiating
body. Indeed one of i t s functions is to ensure
that all laws, ordinances, safety regulations and
co l l e c t i ve agreements are implemented and
observed. Something of a policing body.
The kind of constitution we are considering is a
quite different institution to this and most other
works councils to be found. It will be worthwhile
to remind ourselves of the features and predicted
benefits claimed for i t . The main features can be
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summarized as follows:-
i t c l e a r l y separa tes representa t ive from
executive roles
it clearly separates the legislative function
from that of the executive
al l levels of an executive system are repre-
sented and involved.
- a l l members of council are of equal standing
in their roles as councillors
there is an independent chairman to run
council meetings; he is not a councillor and
has no voting right
a public meeting is recommended
- any matter can be introduced to the council
agenda by any member
there is unanimous voting on legis la t ive
issues
management member will present a report, and
be open to questioning, on the state of the
company/site business.
Some of the predicted benefits of the system are:
i t encourages part ic ipat ion in creating a
legis la t ive framework allowing, constitu
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tionally, employees to control the policy
framework within which they work
Similarly, it encourages managers and others
to make decisions provided that they are
within agreed policy
it provides every employee with right of
appeal against managerial decisions which are
not made within, and in the spirit of, agreed
written policies*
it does much to ensure that policies are fair
and acceptable to all
it recognises people as equal in being but
unequal in doing
it is at least a partially internalised system
(in common with a typical Japanese enterprise
union)
it is localised
it makes strike action unnecessary
- it aids understanding, communication and
negotiation.
A way of looking at organization is by stressing
that an individual working alone cannot usually
*NB. There cannot be an effective appeals procedure
without clear, agreed policies.
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f u l f i l his needs as th i s is understood in a de-
veloped economy, as well as he could if he co-
operated with others. Underlying this concept of
organization is the idea of coordination of effort
in the service of mutual help. Human Societ ies
have found that they can best achieve their goals
if they divide up among their members the various
tasks that need to be accomplished on the basis of
innate t a l en t s or s k i l l s . The cons t i tu t ion out-
l ined above has a primary aim of developing
organizational policies and social practices which
wil l permit some reasonable matching of human
needs and organizat ional demands.
Managements, and companies, need cooperation from
the workforce - cooperation being the shared
effor t on the part of individuals and groups to
achieve jointly desired goals. In practice, much
of Br i t i sh industry is in a s t a t e of conf l ic t
between managements and workforces and th i s is
exacerbated by collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining is essential ly a competitive process,
whereas cooperation is character ised by mutual
aid. "Cooperative cons t i tu t iona l i sm" (with an
elaborate written constitution as in App. I) sots
up mutual rights and obligations which once well
established encourages the parties to abide by the
constitution and not breach i t .
Overall, what we are aiming for in such a company
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cons t i tu t ion is social harmony. However, th is
must occur in a society (Bri t ish society) where
the norm is the exercise of counterveil ing power
r a t h e r than consensus , and in an i n d u s t r i a l
society so structured as to stress capital-labour
conflict. The social inst i tut ions built into such
a company constitution encourage continual contact
and exposure to i s sues of common concern to
represen ta t ives of labour and cap i ta l who, in
time, may come to t ru s t and cooperate with each
other . The evidence from the field study shows
that the constitution can assist in changing a t t i -
tudes and in building constructive and cooperative
behaviour which helps to focus people on goals.
We have seen that there are many di f ferent ways
used to generate employee involvement but in
essence they divide into two schools of thought.
The f i r s t , which a survey of the academic
l i te ra ture would suggest to be the more prevalent
and conventional means as i t is so dominant in the
l i t e r a t u r e , is to do with the behavioural tech-
nology a manager chooses to employ in dealing with
his subordinates and the way in which executive
d e c i s i o n s are taken. The second, which the
Glac ie r model f i t s i n t o , i s to do with the
governance of enterprises. Really we are Looking
at two quite d i f ferent th ings , even though the
objective, of increasing organizational effective
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ness, is similar. Research evidence reveals that
the d i rec t , rather than representative form,
provides the more effective means of improving
teamwork and developing individual motivation, but
nevertheless, the case study clearly demonstrates
the contribution councils can make in a rather
negative (but necessary) area of i n d u s t r i a l
re la t ions . It should be stressed that the two
forms are not mutually exclusive but can be com-
plementary to each other (this was also demon-
strated in the field study).
Of the predicted benefits of the Constitution
detailed above, the firmest evidence to support
them is found with respect to strikes and the wide
ranging nature of councils.
It is predicted that the Constitution makes strike
action unnecessary. Examination of the Policy
Document of The Glacier Metal Company Limited
published in 1961 shows that 'The use of power by
any group at any stage of the procedure is a
breaking of the Constitution'. Or again to quote
from the Draft Procedure Agreement (App. I) '...It
is recognised that if a manager or any represen-
tat ive threatens to use power in an attempt to
force change on others then such an act is a
breach of the Constitution established by this
procedure agreement'.
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Wilfred Brown* (1971) stresses that a bargain must
be struck between management and representatives
of employees the terms of which should include
that management will not attempt to introduce
change in policy without unanimous agreement
of council
that the representative system will not try to
force change on management by using th rea t s
and strikes
in r e t u r n for accept ing t h a t t h r e a t s of
str ike, or actual strike action, are breaches
of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are
e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y in the
f o r m u l a t i o n of any p o l i c i e s , r u l e s ,
regulat ions which they choose to make an
agenda item
represen ta t ives are en t i t l ed to any infor-
mation about the company that can be provided
and which does not in the opinion of the
management member of council endanger the
company or i t s ultra vires.
The evidence about strike action shows that since
the inception of works councils at Glacier the
company was vir tually strike free over a period of
* Brown was chief executive of Glacier Metal for many
years.
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some th i r ty years, and this embracing various
periods of general i n d u s t r i a l unrest in the
country, and in a company with poor industr ial
relat ions before their introduction. Excepting
the minor incident mentioned ea r l i e r , Company X
has also been str ike free over the four years
review period.
If we go on to examine some of the issues brought
before councils in the two cases i t can be seen
that they are wide ranging. At Glacier subjects
discussed have included pay systems, redundancy,
the in t roduct ion of new technology, factory
closure and night shift pol ic ies , and i t can be
seen from the minutes that given time Company X is
likely to deal with equally broad issues in this
way. Perhaps the biggest single issue to come
before Glacier's London council was a s t ra tegic
decision involving the company in selling part of
i t s London Site and moving to another over one
hundred miles away. Certainly this issue was
management i n i t i a t e d but council was highly
involved in the decision making and a team of
experts was appointed to examine and advise on the
feas ib i l i ty of the move. It was decided, and
agreed, that such a move should be made.
The two companies, Glacier and Company X, offer in
interesting contrast with respect to trade union
involvement in their constitutions.
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In the Glacier model unionization of the workforce
was well established prior to the development of
i ts Constitution. The company's chief executive,
Wilfred Brown, was himself both a member of a
t rade union (ASSET) and the Labour Par ty .
Employees of the company were encouraged at a l l
levels to themselves join trade unions.
At Glacier a l l representat ives are elected by
scrutineered secret ba l lo t within work hours
maximizing participation in the process. The trade
u n i o n s g r a n t shop s t e w a r d s c a r d s to
representat ives elected in consti tuencies where
more than 75 per cent of the const i tuents are
members of tha t union. Except for senior
management, employees who are not union members
are disenfranchised for election purposes but are
represented by the shop steward who is elected.
All council agendas and minutes are sent to the
District Trade Union Offices so that any potential
problems may be picked up. However, i t should be
stressed that negotiations are decentralized to
within the company or s i te . Councillors and their
const i tuents are a l l local employees. These
employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s may be a s s i s t ed by
outs ide, paid o f f i c i a l s of the union, but the
unions employ the local elected representatives to
act on thei r behalf. The role of union of f ic ia l s
is to ensure that the shop stewards act within
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o f f i c i a l union po l icy . In p r a c t i c e , union
officials take l i t t l e part in the system.
At company X there was not a long history of a
pluralist ic structure in operation nor were trade
unions well established in the firm.* Neverthe-
less i t is notable that their const i tut ion is
operating union free even though provision is made
for them.
In a l l important ways there is l i t t l e to choose
between the two systems even though their poten-
t i a l power s t ructure is so different . Both have
localised councils at s i t e level minimising the
rank and f i le feeling too cut off from the real
strings of power and both are effectively interna-
lised (Company X more so).
I will argue that the idea of having a system of
industrial relations based on some notion of power
equality is a fallacy. What is important to the
governance of the enterprise is that i t has a
constitution which is plural is t ic , which formally
es tabl ishes the r ights and duties of a l l the
p a r t i e s , and enables the company to be more
responsive to public opinion (in this context
public opinion means employee opinion).
* I t should be noted tha t t rade unions are well
established in most other parts of the multi-national and
Company X is rather the exception to the rule.
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The kind of constitution under discussion has at
f i r s t glance s i m i l a r i t i e s with the Br i t i sh
Constitution in that i t clearly identifies three
systems; legislative, representative and executive
systems. Although the overriding philosophy is
similar, it is really a superficial similarity for
there are considerable differences. Certainly
both operate on the basis of universal suffrage
with the regular election, by secret ballot, of
represen ta t ives . However, in the Bri t ish
Consti tution there is a three stage process
linking the systems for the executive (Cabinet) is
usually drawn from the representative system
(Commons) which in turn is drawn from the people.
The Company Constitution has greater similarity to
the American system of government where the House
of Representatives emerges from the people but may
have a majority view different to that of the
elected President and the executive he appoints.
In other words the majority in the House of
Representatives may oppose the administration and
thwart i t which does not usually happen in the
British system as the cabinet is drawn from the
majority party in the House of Commons.
The power structure in a company is different to
either of these cases. The key difference is that
whereas in the British (or American) Constitution
government is on behalf of the people in a company
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that is not so: government, in the law, is on
behalf of the owners of the business and, in
effect, negotiation must occur between top manage-
ment and employees.
Environmental factors impinge on internal con-
dit ions in a firm in that people's expectations
about what it should be like to work in a company
are al tered. This can affect organizational
climate which Schwartz and Davis (1981) define as
a measure of whether people's expectations are
being met or not. In Britain there has been a
steady extension of the franchise during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries following the Con-
stitutional crisis which led to the Reform Act of
1832. The happenings at Company X in 1977 were a
demand by a significant part of the workforce for
a b e t t e r alignment between t h e i r r i gh t s as
citizens and those a employees which led to a new
Constitution. Whether democracy can be applied in
companies is both a matter of debate and of
defini t ion. One way of looking at i t , which can
be valid in firms, is to suggest that in a demo-
cra t i c society government will be responsive to
public opinion. A way which is invalid is to
suggest that there should also be a choice of
policies offered to electors and consequently the
idea of alternative government.
A major a l ternat ive to a Constitution, and a
125
structure which is very common in Britain, is the
closed shop agreement. At first sight this also
appears to increase worker power and control
(making the workplace more democratic) but the
reality is quite different. A company faced with
a confrontation model of industrial relations
based on collectivism and the exercise of power
will usually aim to get cooperation. One way of
achieving this is the closed shop. Closed shop
agreements are about increasing power. A company
may see an ideal relationship with a trade union
as being one where a strong union negotiates a
collective agreement with the employer, and it is
understood by the parties that the union will
police the contract, in exchange the employer
encouraging union membership.
The danger for the company of this arrangement is
that when the union takes over policing the
contract, management abdicates its responsibility
for managing and leaves this to the shop steward.
In extreme cases, the union, through the shop
Stewart, acts the role of manager controlling
reward, and as it now controls the supply of
labour, it effectively controls appointments.
Additionally, when pay is negotiated on a coL-
lective basis, usually a principle of equaLity
rules and the recognition of individual merit is
missing from the system. Not only can this kind
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of s i tua t ion lead to loss of management control ,
but there is a corresponding loss of rank and file
control in the union, participation is minimised,
and neither the company nor the union is respon-
sive to public opinion i.e. rank and f i le worker
opinion.
In contrast, constitutional government of enter-
prises featuring a multi-level council provides a
forum involving representatives of all groups who
regularly s i t down and discuss issues. Such a
council aims to expose conflict by bringing it out
into the open and attempting to resolve i t . In
time th is process has been shown to break down
mistrust between groups and improve their under-
standing; to develop more positive attitudes with
participants sharing certain ends and values which
may allow them to be better prepared to give each
other the benefits of any doubts which may arise.
However, th is is not the same as in the national
setting, where the executive (the prime minister
and cabine t ) is p e r i o d i c a l l y e lec ted by the
people, and is consequently l ikely to be more
responsive to public opinion than top management
in a company.
The idea in democracy of opposition is carried out
in council at the time of the management member's
report on the s ta te of the business and any other
m a t t e r s of r e l e v a n c e . At t h i s t ime
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representatives of employees are free to question
and cri t icise the representative of top management
(and of capital) .
An important by-product of a Constitution is
tolerance. In the British Constitution, tolerance
is a principle of long standing and has developed
gradually from the struggles of the seventeenth
century. Although i t can be aided by laws i t is
s t i l l more an a t t i tude of mind. This introduces
the concept of permanence and a recognition that
we are all attached to each other, dependent upon
each other, and must get on with each other. A
nation is a more or less permanent in s t i tu t ion ,
and only in unusual s i tuat ions can one leave i t .
In the sett ing of a nation tolerance is a neces-
sity. In contrast, companies are much more short
lived; although successful companies may remain in
existence for a century or two, unsuccessful
companies remain for a very short time. Further,
the degree of permanence of a company's employees
is even more short l ived . In Br i ta in (and
America) most company employees are engaged with
limited tenure contracts which can be terminated
within a period of notice (commonly a week or a
month) which does not encourage a feeling oE
permanent attachment. It is worth noting in this
connection that employment conditions are more
favourable in Japan where some people enjoy life
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time contracts and this can encourage a stronger
corporate feeling.
Additionally the nature of the contract often used
in the West is rather specific limiting what will
be exchanged. Usually in British companies the
idea of the whole person being committed to the
relation is only found in those filling high
status, high discretion roles.
The third difficulty to be overcome in companies
is that of membership. In nations the people are
members of the nation and government is delegated
by them, whereas in British Companies, the members
are the shareholders and those involved in a
Constitution are employees.
Why then should a Constitution work and be
sustained? The evidence provided by the two cases
is good - Glacier's Constitution has been in
existence for well over thirty years and Company
X's vigorous after four. This evidence is
particularly encouraging when consideration is
given to the changes of personnel in both firms.
Glacier has had what can be identified as three
different generations of management although it
cannot be given a clean bill of health. When the
third change occurred in the late 1970's the new
regime was recruited from outside and there was a
strong feeling to change all that was old. The
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Constitution remains and is operational but i t is
not so vigorous as ear l ie r . Company X's condition
is more c r i t i c a l as the mul t i -na t iona l appoints
i t s top management from a cent ra l pool on two to
three year assignments. This Consti tut ion was
able to demons t ra te i t s worth to the new
management and became more ra ther than less
vigorous. But then i t is younger and not facing
any l ife cycle problems.
There are two, or possibly three, major factors in
sustaining a Company Const i tu t ion. F i r s t , is a
concept of deterence in that the a l t e r n a t i v e s
( c o l l e c t i v e barga in ing being one) are l e s s
a t t r a c t i v e to a l l the p a r t i e s . Second, is the
f i rm 's environment which, if i t is i t s e l f
democratic, will make a Company Constitution seem
the n a t u r a l way of managing e n t e r p r i s e s . A
successful Constitution will permit as much par t i -
c i p a t i o n as p o s s i b l e and, as in democra t ic
n a t i o n s , w i l l a l low for management to be
responsive to public opinion. I t wil l embody
democratic principles permitting free speech and
freedom to c r i t i c i s e . This wil l have impact on
l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e for where freedom e x i s t s
management wi l l consis t of persuading peopLe
ra ther than using coercive methods. Third, i t
must t o l e ra t e imperfect ions. For instance, to
quote Glacier ' s Policy Document of 1965 'Realism
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forces the recognition that power may be resorted
to from time to time, and the Constitution broken.
Such use of power does not necessarily, however,
destroy the Constitution. Part of the value of
having a Constitution is to be able to recognise
clearly when it is being broken, so that due care
may be exercised to avoid destroying it by such
frequent breaks as would bring it into disrepute1.
This paragraph gives some idea of the importance
for everyone in a company with an established
Constitution of the high regard in which it is
held, and an awareness of i t s f r ag i l i t y if
misused. Perhaps also it demonstrates a need for
a pragmatic approach.
2.3 UNIVERSALITY OF EMPLOYEES DESIRE FOR PARTICIPATION
I t was n o t i c e a b l e in the Company X case t h a t the
industrial relations problem was found in two
areas: among blue-collar workers in a manufac-
turing si te and in an engineering craft depart-
ment. The other main areas - administration
(including finance, accounting, sales and
marketing) and business development (a multi-
disciplinary development department involving
market, product and manufacturing development) -
were free of the difficulty. Similarly, the
occurrence of collectivism was restricted to the
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manufacturing and craft areas. When represen-
tation and par t ic ipat ion was being discussed in
1977 the greates t involvement was in the blue-
c o l l a r a r ea s . When evaluat ing what had been
achieved four years l a t e r , the greatest benefit
from the Constitution was felt by the blue-collar
workers, who were very en thus ias t ic , and top
management.
This impression was heightened in 1981, when I
realised that none of my interviewees were from
the headquarters site or the business development
department. I pressed to meet people from these
areas but met with no success . The minutes
clearly showed that the Headquarters Council met
regularly and that business development staff took
part in their site council. When I questioned the
personnel manager and other interviewees on this
matter I gathered that they did not do so with any
great enthusiasm. This finding did not accord
with my entry assumption of a universal desire for
par t ic ipa t ion by a l l groups of employees, but
examination of the academic l i t e r a t u r e and
research evidence on value systems and reference
groups goes some way to explaining i t .
Organization and management theory has tended
towards simplified and generalised conceptions of
human motivation. Empirical research has consis
tent ly found some support for the simplified
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generalised conception, but only some. Con-
sequently, the major impact of decades of research
has been to complicate our models of human nature
and how to manage people. Not only do people have
many needs and potentials, but the patterning of
those needs changes with age, changes of role and
with situations.
Variable behaviour based on situational realities
has come to be called a "contingency theory",
signalling the fact that there is no one best way
of handling all situations.
Both Pearlin (1962) and Argyris (1964) in studying
the alienation of workers in industrial organi-
zations found cases of workers who were not
alienated because their personal needs and pre-
dispositions made them comfortable in a highly
authoritarian situation which demanded little of
them, either because they did not seek challenge
and autonomy or because they genuinely respected
authority and status. In a classic study of four
types of industrial workers Blauner (1964) found
evidence for very different patterns of alienation
depending upon the nature of the technology
involved in the work. He defined alienation as
being the resultant of our different psychological
states which are, in principle, independent of
each other: (a) sense of power1essness or
inability to influence the work situation; (b)
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loss of meaning in the work; (c) sense of social
isolation, lack of feeling of belonging to a work
group or an organization; and, (d) lack of any
self-involvement with work, a sense that work is
merely a means to an end. Automobile assembly
workers were found to be alienated in terms of all
four cr i ter ia . On the other hand chemical workers
operating highly automated plant had a great deal
of respons ib i l i ty for controll ing the process,
considerable autonomy and because of the high
respons ib i l i ty fe l t involved in the work. This
kind of v a r i a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s the danger of
g e n e r a l i s i n g about a l i e n a t i o n among factory
workers.
The c lass ic Herzberg study of over 200 engineers
and accountants highlighted that intrinsic factors
motivated them most (i.e. factors which relate to
the immediate interaction between the worker and
the job).
Hackman and his colleagues (Hackman and Lawler
1971, Hackman and Oldham 1975, 1979) built on this
foundation by analyzing a large number of jobs and
identifying core job dimensions which if they are
present may resu l t in high quali ty performance.
The basic theory underlying the model is that
desirable outcomes both for the person, in terms
of internal satisfaction and motivation, and for
the company, in terms of performance, will result
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only if the worker can achieve three c r i t i c a l
psychological s ta tes .
1. The work must be f e l t to be meaningful ,
worthwhile or important
2. The worker must feel responsible for the work
outcome
3. the worker must be able to determine in some
regular and r e l i ab le way what r e su l t s are
ach i eved and whether or not they a re
satisfactory.
The core job dimensions should be devised to lead
to the requ is i t e psychological s t a t e s . These
dimensions are:
A. Ski l l va r i e ty : The degree to which a job
challenges a variety of ski l l s and ab i l i t i e s
B. Task iden t i t y : The degree to which a job
r e q u i r e s c o m p l e t i o n of a whole and
iden t i f i ab le piece of work i .e. doing a job
from beginning to end with a visible outcome
C. Task s igni f icance: The degree to which the
job has a substantial and visible impact.
The above th ree dimensions t o g e t h e r , i t is
suggested, create the degree to which the employee
experiences the job as meaningful.
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D. Autonomy: The degree to which the job gives
the employee freedom, independence and
discret ion in scheduling work and determining
how i t will be carried out.
This dimension is related to giving people a sense
of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the second c r i t i c a l
psychological s t a t e .
E. Feedback: The degree to which the employee
ge ts information about the e f f ec t iveness of
his e f for t s .
Although the job dimensions themselves are most
c r i t i c a l , e x t r i n s i c f ac to r s such as pay, soc i a l
c o n d i t i o n s and company p o l i c i e s can a c t as
d i s s a t i s f i e r s if they are not s a t i s f a c t o r y . This
schoo l of t h i n k i n g s u g g e s t s , however , t h a t
e x t r i n s i c f a c t o r s a re not t h e m s e l v e s good
motivators.
Other r e sea rche r s such as Maslow, Alderfer and
McClelland provide theories about basic needs or
motives which have s i m i l a r i t y to each o the r , and
are not out of l i ne with Hackman's work. Maslow
(1954) f e l t t h a t the b a s i c human needs wi.re
arranged in h i e r a r c h i c a l order , and argued tha t
higher order needs would not become ac t ive u n t i l
lower o r d e r needs could be s a t i s f i e d . HLS
hie ra rchy (bottom to top) i s ( i) phys io log ica l
needs ( i i ) safety needs ( i i i ) a f f i l i a t i on - social
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needs (iv) self-esteem needs - feedback from
others (v) self-actualization. The strength of the
theory lies in drawing attention to the variety of
needs and motives which operate, but the evidence
for the hierarchical notion is weak and the need
categories tend to be very general.
Alderfer (1972) takes the Maslow needs and groups
them into three more basic categories - needs for
existence, needs to relate to others, and needs
for personal growth. The approach acknowledges
the possibility that not everyone has an equal
amount of the basic needs, as Maslow seems to
imply.
McClelland (1961, 1976) identifies three basic
needs - for achievement, for power, for
affiliation. Studies of different occupations
have shown that, for instance, entrepreneurs, as
contrasted with teachers or lawyers, tend to be
higher than average with achievement motivation,
and lower than average in affiliation motivation.
They are most concerned with successful task
accomplishment. By contrast, high-level general
managers who have worked their way up tend to have
high power needs and to display this power by
trying to influence others towards the
accomplishment of organizational goals.
The various need theories provide a useful set of
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categories for analysing human motivation and
research into them has stressed that different
people are likely to have different needs and that
these may be situational.
Clearly what these theoreticians and researchers
are advocating is good managerial practice resting
on organization design and job design coupled with
sound manpower policies. Unfortunately it is not
easy, pa r t i cu la r ly in low technology volume
production operations, to design manual jobs
reflecting these ideals and much alienation has
occurred in industry. This has tended to result
in an emphasis being placed on indus t r ia l
relations and then pal l ia t ives , such as formal
systems of employee participation and industrial
democracy, are sought. In other words, when it is
difficult, or even impossible, to employ intrinsic
motivation we resort to extrinsic means.
The Herzberg study, which triggered much of the
subsequent research into worker needs and moti-
vation, was of course performed on professionals
although later people tended to apply the ideas
more widely. Professionals seldom complain about
monotony, since the complexity of the work and the
satisfaction of applying accomplished skills keeps
them motivated. Likewise, alienation is not a
major issue, since i t is the professionals who
normally control their own work. The clearest
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evidence for self-actualization assumptions comes
from professionals and managers who tend to be
highly work involved and for whom challenge and
meaningful work are central values (Pelz and
Andrews 1962, Bailyn and Schein 1979).
McGregor (1966) suggests that 'whilst economic
rewards are certainly important to the profes-
sional there is ample research to demonstrate that
they do not provide the primary incentive1. He
goes on to say that 'to realise the full potential
of professional resources industr ia l management
must permit and encourage self-control. Creative
intellectual effort is a function of genuine com-
mitment to objectives, under conditions that
provide for a substantial degree of self-direction
and self-control ' .
Mintzberg (1979) provides an interest ing way of
looking at jobs in terms of the degree of
special izat ion in, what he ca l l s , the horizontal
and vertical planes.
HORIZONTAL SPECIALIZATION
High Low
High
VERTICAL
SPECIALI-
ZATION
Low
Unskilled jobs
(Blue-collar &
clerical)
Professional
jobs
Low level
managerial jobs
Other
managerial
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What he is saying here is that typical blue col lar
jobs are narrow and have l i t t l e discretion, whilst
senior management jobs, at the other extreme, are
broad and have much discretion. Professional jobs
( i .e . spec ia l i s t ) are complex and specialized
horizontally but not vertically.
Value systems* are an important element in the
individual's frame of reference. Pennings (1970)
refers to the work of Seeman 1967, Turner and
Lawrence 1965 and Friedlander 1965 showing that
usually the value systems of white collar workers
are i n t r i n s i c a l l y oriented, whereas blue col lar
workers a t t r i b u t e a g r e a t e r importance to
extrinsic values.
Merton's (1968) reference group theory can be used
to expla in d i f f e r ences in value systems. A
reference group is a group or social collectivity
the norms and values of which are accepted or
rejected by an individual . Merton demonstrated
that the amount of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d upward
mobi l i ty genera tes a v e r t i c a l or ho r i zon ta l
d i r e c t i o n of comparison. In companies with
favourable advancement opportunities, individuals
compare themselves with groups or col lect ivi t ies
of higher pos i t ions , whereas in systems with un
* Work-value systems can be defined as conste l la t ions of
attitudes and opinions with which an individual evaluates
his job and work environment.
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favourable advancement opportunities they compare
themselves with peers.
Research in the Netherlands and the United States
indicates that low s ta tus , white collar workers
tend to have a work-value system rather similar to
their fellow blue-collar workers (Friedlander
1965, Seeman 1967). Among high status white-
collar workers, however, the work-value system is
predominantly intrinsic.
Pennings (1970) in his study of a large electronic
manufacturing company in the Netherlands also
found two distinct white-collar categories could
be discerned. Low white-collar workers belonged
to the same formal level as blue-collar workers
and shared unionization, salary level and fringe
benefits with them, although they did not do
manual work. High white-collar workers were more
professional, had an individual job agreement and
were not unionized. It was found from inter-
viewing 314 people in the company that the
importance at tr ibuted to in t r ins ic work aspects
varied with expected promotion rates. Also, where
there was high promotion expectancy the emphasis
was on individualism, whereas where the promotion
rate was low the emphasis was on collectivism.
It is clear from this review that the needs of
higher capaci ty employees such as managers,
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specialists and professionals are more readily
satisfied through processes of delegation and
career progression than is possible for blue-
collar and clerical workers. In this context i t
is comforting that the problem is tending to
reduce in fully developed economies, as the
developments in technology require an increasing
number of scientists and technologists whilst
greater automation has led to a reduction of
operators, craftsmen and clerical staff. Stout
(1982) shows changes of numbers in occupations in
the United Kingdom engineering industry. The same
trends are seen in other industries.
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The research into value systems and reference
groups f i t s q u i t e well with the Company x
findings. At the i n s t a l l a t i o n stage in 1977, i t
was found that c ler ical personnel exhibited con-
siderable interest in the system of participation
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then being discussed. This refinement f i ts well
with the earlier findings of Pennings, Seeman and
Friedlander which divided white-collar staff into
low and high status groups, and where low status
white-collar workers tended to have a work-value
system rather similar to their fellow blue-collar
workers. The spread of white-collar unions in
Britain gives further evidence on this.
In 1983, to test the theory that professionals are
int r ins ical ly motivated and looking for career
advancement, I carried out a survey of a number of
high potential people in manufacturing industry
(mostly graduates and engineers). The line of
questioning was with respect to what was most
important to them in a job and what they were
looking for from a company. Their responses to
the former were such things as "challenge,"
"reward," "variety", "satisfaction" and to the
latter career opportunity and progression.
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3.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
In t h i s concluding sec t ion of the repor t I want to do
two th ings . F i r s t , to summarise the fac tua l evidence,
and then to put forward various conjectures from the
research which should aid its u t i l i ty .
The case study demonstrates quite clearly that a
programme of OD has the potential to successfully
introduce change in organizations, and indeed in this
application it achieved everything that was aimed for.
The solution employed is certainly not typical of most
OD programmes which are more l i k e l y to use
behaviourally oriented processes such as the Grid, T-
groups, Likert's System 4 or MBO rather than here,
where a much more s t ruc tu r a l approach has been
adopted: although aiming to al ter behaviour i t
operates more in the socio-political field rather than
that of psychology.
We have seen that much of the l i t e r a t u r e on
participation is concerned with measuring what people
who have not experienced it think about it . There are
also a limited number of studies of people's attitudes
to participative systems which have been imposed upon
them. There are very few studies of the responses of
employees to part icipative systems which have been
designed and implemented to meet their expressed
desires - or better , as in this case, that they have
helped design themselves. Thus this report could be
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of practical use to others working with OD in general,
and particularly constitutions and works councils. It
is a finding that we should be f lexible using OD,
matching the solution carefully to the problem to be
solved and the results to be achieved.
Whilst I would not claim tha t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
management provides the most powerful means of
improving teamwork and developing ind iv idua l
motivation (although i t may help) the field study
demonst ra tes the c o n t r i b u t i o n i t can make to
indus t r ia l r e l a t ions . Quite c lear ly if the or iginal
labour relations problems had been left untreated - as
they were at Grunwick - then matters could have got
worse, possibly resulting in open conflict between the
var ious groups. As i t is the provis ion of a
Constitution has enabled the company to move from i ts
former unitary system to the p l u r a l i s t i c s t ructure
which conditions in England encourage, and which was
being demanded by a powerful group of employees.
However, this is not a plural is t ic structure based on
c o n f r o n t a t i o n as i s o f t en the c a s e , but on
cooperation. I am also impressed, writing in 1984,
that the Constitution is now over six years old and
has withstood changes in management and a major change
in the poli t ical climate in the country.
We have seen from the case study evidence that the
predicted features and benefits of the Constitution
were realised. My viewpoint on proving or disproving
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entry theor i e s follows Popper's concept of research
method i.e. that theories (or generalised conjectures)
can never be proved true, but that we can have greater
confidence in them as successive experience in the
field fai ls to falsify them.
However, there were two unpredicted by-products of the
project and they have given me much food for thought.
The unpredicted aspects are that :
those involved in the o r i g i n a l u n i o n i z a t i o n
dispute withdrew from TASS when they saw the
Constitution operating, and
i t was found that the des i re for a system of
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n was not whole-
heartedly endorsed by middle-management and some
other white-collar employees.
Such rapid withdrawal from the union was unexpected.
My own view, and I s t i l l hold i t , was that such a
C o n s t i t u t i o n can o p e r a t e with or wi thout union
involvement. Both Wilfred Brown and Bil l Morton
(Glacier's convenor) disagreed favouring unionization.
I expected, and designed in, union involvement. In
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r company, which did not have a long
his to ry of unioniza t ion , i t seemed l ike ly to me that
when the Const i tu t ion was well e s t ab l i shed , some
employees might see union membership as being
unnecessary and withdraw, leaving councils partly, if
less , unionized.
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This finding does unquestionably provide the most
dramatic aspect of the project, and as a possible
outcome of such a programme, will have an appeal to
many managements. Equally, it may cause opposition to
constitutional councils from trade unions. We do not
have evidence about whether such councils operate
better with or without unions. In practice, the
degree of union involvement in such constitutions will
depend upon local circumstances.
It is the second finding - representative par t ic i -
pation's lack of universal appeal - which has caused
most food for thought.
I entered into this field study in 1977 sharing a
belief with other members of the Glacier school of
management thinking that constitutionally-based works
councils were part of the requisite organization of
companies and other work systems. Included in this
assumption was the idea that all employees (excepting
perhaps some top managements) wanted to participate in
a form of representative democracy. I came to reaLise
during the research programme that this is incorrect.
Whilst I in no way wish to reduce the importance of
constitutions in organization design, or for that
matter, the place of other forms of participative
management, i t is now my view that they are only of
secondary importance.
To discover what is of primary importance we should
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look again at the nature and needs of companies.
Businesses operate in a competitive environment and
must seek competitive advantage. In other words, they
must gain a sustainable edge over their competitors.
To do th is they must f i r s t derive a competitive
strategy ( i .e . a business s t ra tegy) . This will in-
volve them in analysing themselves, identifying
strengths and weaknesses, and deciding how they want
to compete and what they want to offer a c lear ly
defined market, both now and in the future.
Having developed a s t ra tegy, and made plans, i t is
then equally important that they are able to carry
them out. Delivery requires goals to be ident i f ied ,
tasks to be distributed, and efforts to be controlled
and coordinated to ensure that goals are reached.
Here we are defining management's role; for management
must embrace both the setting of a goal and the mani-
pulation of resources to achieve i t . It is here, in
the manipulation of resources, that par t ic ipa t ion
(including constitutional councils) has a part to play
if viewed as a management tool.
It can be argued, as enthusiasts wi l l , that p a r t i c i -
pative processes will aid company effectiveness, and
yet if we examine the s t ructure of companies (in-
cluding successful examples) we find that cons t i -
tut ional councils - a pa r t i cu la r ly thorough form of
representative participation - are not very prevalent.
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This leads me to the view that par t ic ipa t ion is only
of secondary importance in organizing companies
whereas i t is essen t ia l to the i r success that they
have
requisite business policy and strategy
an effective command and control system, and
the right people in key jobs.
However, there are situations which can benefit from
works councils. Equally there are others which will
not. It wil l be helpful to future researchers and
consultants in this field if, based on my experience,
limiting conditions can be given.
The most l ike ly procedure to successfully develop a
constitution will , in my view, use OD principles. The
case study draws attention to two pre-conditions which
must e x i s t if a major programme of OD is to be
successfully applied.
F i r s t , there must e x i s t a condi t ion within the
organization which causes sufficient discomfort to key
members for them to want to change.
Second, i t is v i t a l to obta in the wholehearted
commitment of the uni t ' s chief executive to what is
proposed.
I have seen, and been involved in, other large scale
OD programmes which have not been so successful and I
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now rea l i se that a major reason for their failure was
tha t one or other of these p re -condi t ions did not
ex i s t .
Turning now to o rgan iza t ions where c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
c o u n c i l s themse lves should succeed. They w i l l
feature :
Managers who feel secure in the i r pos i t i ons . If
they are insecure, they will perceive any p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n by s u b o r d i n a t e s as a t h r e a t to t h e i r
authority and undermining their s ta tus .
Managers who are open-minded to subordinates 1
suggestions and who give credit to good ideas.
- Employees who want to become involved and have the
capacity to par t i c ipa te .
Units which enjoy sufficient autonomy, however, i t
will be remembered that Company X only had limited
autonomy within i t s multi-national corporation.
These features point towards a firm which has f i r s t
wel l s t r u c t u r e d i t s e x e c u t i v e sys tem, and i s
r ea sonab ly d e c e n t r a l i z e d . Where the manager ia l
hierarchy is weak, r ep r e sen t a t i ve p a r t i c i p a t i o n is
unl ikely to f lour i sh ( i t is therefore l i ke ly that
p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l f i t b e t t e r in s u c c e s s f u l
companies) .
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It is also worth stressing that my experience suggests
that councils will not make a significant contribution
unless they are wanted by employees. In places where
competitive individualism reigns, compounded in firms
with good institutionalised upward mobility and where
jobs provide intrinsic motivation, people's value
systems will not welcome representative participation.
The published research evidence about value systems
supports this conjecture.
From this it is clear that constitutions should not be
applied in an unlimited way and do not provide a
panacea to cure all ills. And yet they can, in the
right circumstances, provide a solution to industrial
relations problems as this report demonstrates.
Equally, they can introduce democratic principles into
companies with benefits to both managements and
employees. Government can now be carried out with the
consent of the governed, both legitimising it and
making it more responsive to employee opinion.
Councils should improve workers' understanding of
managerial decisions and lead to an attitudinal change
at least partly based on increased trust. They there-
fore have the potential to give rise to an inclination
to leave management to manage and for both parties to
find that they have increased control.
Finally, we should recognise that constitutions can be
fragile and face life cycle problems where "what is
old must be changed" (although both Glacier and
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Company X a r e e n c o u r a g i n g e x a m p l e s w i t h t h e i r
l o n g e v i t y ) .
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APPENDIX
DRAFT PROCEDURE AGREEMENT
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. The management and employees have a common objective
to ensure the continuance of the operations of the
company in the development, manufacture and marketing
of its products and in ensuring the efficiency of
those operations in the interest of employees, share-
holders and customers.
2. Management must possess authority to make decisions
about the operation of the company. The bounds of
that authority, however, are limited by policies
set by directors on behalf of shareholders, policies
established in the contracts negotiated with customers,
and policies agreed in negotiation between management
and the representatives of employees.
Thus management recognises the power of employees to
set limits to the extent of their decision-making
authority whilst employees recognise that within those
limits management have the authority continuously to
make the decisions (subject to individual appeal)
which are necessary for the efficient operation of
the enterprise.
3. It is recognised that continuous changes in the policies
bounding the decision-making authority of managers is
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inevitable and that where they affect the interests
of employees they cannot be changed without the agree-
ment of the representatives of all who might be
affected. Accordingly, a policy-making institution
shall be established in the form of a company or an
area council* composed of the chief executive and
representatives of all strata of employees.
4. Effective agreement on policy changes requires that
all members of a council shall individually possess
the right to veto proposals from other members until
such modifications have been made as to render them
tolerable and that the status quo shall continue to
operate until agreement is reached. It is recognised
that if a manager or any representative threatens to
use power in an attempt to force change upon others
then such an act is a breach of the constitution
established by this procedure agreement.
5. An individual employee shall have right of appeal to
higher authority against a manager's decisions if
they are felt to be unfair or unjust to the individual
or not in keeping with the terms and spirit of agreed
policies.
6. Every employee shall have personal right of access to
the manager who allocates work to him, has personal
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knowledge of his performance, and has the authority
to make decisions about him based on that knowledge.
* Experience suggests that negotiating bodies operate
best when they contain representatives of employees
working within the same geographical area. Where a
company operates establishments in different areas
it will be found necessary to establish an area rather
than a company council. In such a case it would be
the chief executive of that area rather than of the
company who would sit as management member. Similarly
when setting up appeals mechanisms it would be the
area chief executive who would preside at the final
stage.
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NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE
Intention
1. The company and the employees agree that it is in their
mutual interest to observe a Negotiating Procedure
by which all issues arising between them can be resolved
as speedily as possible.
2. The use of power or threat of use of power either by
managers or representatives in an attempt to force
through a proposition at any stage of the negotiation
is a breach of this procedure.
3. Issues which affect one person only and are a question
of felt unfairness within existing policy will be
dealt with under the Appeals Procedure.
4. Issues which affect one section only and are not felt
by other representatives to affect their sections,
will be negotiated between management and the represent-
atives or representative of that section.
5. General issues affecting all sections will be referred
to the Council.
6. Normal earnings will be paid to employees in respect
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of time spent in meeting management to resolve issues.
Procedure
1. Employee Representative/Section Manager
1.1 If the employees are not satisfied with the conditions
on their section the representatives will raise the
matter on behalf of their constituents with the section
manager.
1.2 The section manager concerned must meet the
representatives with the least possible delay and will
use his best endeavours to resolve the issue consulting
with other members of management if he feels this to
be necessary.
2. Representative/Higher Management
2.1 In the event of the section manager being unable
to reach agreement with the representative rapidly he
will refer it to a higher level of management and the
negotiations will continue there.
2.2 If, at the beginning of the discussions between
the section manager and the representative, the section
manager realises that the changes sought are outside
his personal authority, then he will ascertain who is
the manager possessing the required authority and refer
the matter to him immediately.
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3. Council
3.1 If discussions between the representatives and
higher management fail to resolve the issue then at the
discretion of either representative or management,
the matter will be placed on the agenda of the next
meeting of the council.
3.2 Issues which involve more than one section or
which can affect all sections may, at any stage in
the Negotiating Procedure, be referred to the council.
3.3 Should the issue in question require urgent
consideration then either the representatives or manage-
ment may call for an extraordinary meeting of the
council.
4. Group Industrial Relations Manager/Trade Union Official
4.1 If at any stage of negotiation either party to
the discussion feels that the presence of a personnel
officer and/or trade union official would assist in
clarification of the issues, then he or they will be
asked to attend the negotiations.
4.2 Should the most senior personnel manager feel
that the issues under negotiation are of importance
to other areas of the group, then he has the right
to be present.
4.3 Management will refrain from agreeing changes with
trade union officials without the presence of elected
representatives of the employees who may be affected.
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5. Trade Union Representation
If the majority of members in a department vote a
union member as their representative and that represent-
ative wants an official of the union to assist him
in discussion with management, then management will
meet that official.
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APPEALS PROCEDURE
1. Every employee shall have right of appeal against
any decision made by his immediate manager which:
(a) he believes to be an infringement of agreed
policy, or
(b) he feels to be unjust in its affect on himself,
2. The manager hearing the appeal will be referred to as
the Presiding Manager. The Presiding Manager will
ensure before proceeding with an appeal hearing that
the appellant has discussed his grievance with his
manager before appealing.
The Presiding Manager will record in words agreed by
the appellant and the defendant the nature of the
decision in dispute and the redress sought.
The Presiding Manager will give his judgement in the
presence of both the appellant and the defendant and
shall record it in writing.
3. Should it emerge during an appeal that the appellant
is in fact seeking changes in existing policy rather
than reversal of his manager's decision, then the
Presiding Manager will discontinue the proceedings
and advise the appellant of the appropriate channels
through which to pursue his objective.
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4. Right of appeal shall lapse unless the employee notifies
his intention to appeal within three working days of
first being informed by his manager of the decision
against which he wishes to appeal.
If the lapse of time exceeds three days then right of
appeal is at the discretion of management.
5. Managers shall be accountable for ensuring that
successive stages of any appeal are heard with the
minimum possible lapse of time. They should be heard
in terms of hours and days rather than weeks.
6. The appellant is allowed and advised to have present
at an appeal his representative to assist him in
presentation of his case. Alternatively, the
appellant is permitted to have present another employee
from his department or section or his trade union
official.
7. The appellant and defendant have the right to call
witnesses. Such witnesses will leave the appeal
hearing when they have given their evidence and
answered questions.
8. When the appeal of an employee is upheld the manager
whose decision has been set aside shall himself have
right of appeal to the next higher level of
management.
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9. The Presiding Manager shall prevent criticism by those
present at a hearing of other persons not present.
If threats of any kind are made the Presiding Manager
will suspend the hearing until such threats are
withdrawn.
10. If appellant and defendant agree, the issue in dispute
may, at any stage of an appeal, be taken for advice
but not for decision, to a personnel officer.
11. The most senior personnel officer or his nominee has
the right to be present at any appeal hearing.
12. After the final appeal before the chief executive
(of the company or of the area as the case may be),
if the appellant remains aggrieved he has the right
to be heard by the committee of which his represent-
ative is a member. If a majority of that committee
of representatives believes that injustice persists
in the case of the appellant they have the right to
discuss the matter with the chief executive.
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DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
1. Intention
Sanctions must be available to managers to assist them
in ensuring that agreed procedures, rules and instructions,
are adhered to by their immediate subordinates and to
be able to deal with subordinates whose performance is
inadequate.
2. Sanctions
The sanctions available to managers are as follows:
2.1 To indicate to an immediate subordinate that he
is losing opportunity for promotion or for increase
of remuneration.
2.2 To transfer an immediate subordinate to another
role within his immediate command which involves
different work in hope that the subordinate will
perform better.
2.3 To have an immediate subordinate removed from his
position (deselect) and made available to the personnel
department as a possible candidate for other vacant
roles within the organization.
2.4 A manager who believes that a subordinate is
guilty of conduct which is prejudicial to the safety
of other persons or of equipment may instruct him to
leave the company's premises and take such steps,
within the law, as will lessen such danger.
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3. Procedure
3.1 A manager who is critical of an immediate
subordinate's performance or behaviour must take all
reasonable steps to inform the subordinate, to discuss
the situation with him, to give further training if
he feels it appropriate and, in general, to give him
time to improve his performance or conduct.
3.2 If the foregoing does not produce improvement
then the manager must give the subordinate a first
formal warning which the manager must record in his
presence.
3.3 If performance or conduct continues to be so
unsatisfactory that the manager decides that de-
selection may be necessary he will give his subordinate
a warning in writing of his intentions to de-select if
performance or conduct has not improved within a stated
period, state details of his criticisms and inform the
representative of the written warning so given. The
subordinate may, if he so wishes, have his represent-
ative present when this second written warning is
given. The written details of the warning will be
removed from the employee's record after 12 months.
4. Right of Appeal
As with all managerial decisions, those listed in
this section are subject to appeal.
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THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM
Intention
1. The company has need of employee representatives in
order that it may be aware of the viewpoint of its
employees in all sections and at all levels.
2. The company acknowledges its duty to recognise and to
be available to meet representatives of its employees.
3. The company recognises that employee representatives
are elected to state the views of their constituents
which may not necessarily coincide with the personal
views of those acting in a representative role and
that representatives have the duty and right to
express their constituents1 views.
4. It is agreed that employee representatives, if they
are to undertake their duties effectively must be given
time off from normal duties in their role of employee.
A request must be made by the employee representative
to his immediate manager for permission to leave his
job in order to attend to his representative business.
Such a request may not be unreasonably witheld.
5. Where the numbers employed in a particular area or
stratum of employees justify, in the opinion of the
management, further facilities for the chairman or
secretary or convenor of a committee of representatives,
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these will be provided and may cover an office,
telephone, notice boards, secretarial assistance,
document copying facilities and relief from some or
all work periods.
6. The Representative System is composed of constituents,
constituencies, elected representatives and committees
of representatives. Decisions as to the boundaries
of different constituencies, methods of election
of representatives and the committees which they may
form are matters for employees to decide. The efficient
working of the company will be rendered more difficult
if constituency boundaries fail to coincide as far as
possible with the organizational structure which
divides the company into departments, offices and
functions. Management is therefore concerned about
the structure of the representative system and shall
be provided with opportunity to comment before any
particular arrangement is adopted.
7. Management must know what the structure of the
Representative System is and be assured that the methods
of election of representatives have been formalised
and appropriately conducted so that it can ensure that
it meets only with duly authorised representatives,
8. Management would feel assured on (7) above if the
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following methods of election of representatives are
operated.
Election Procedure
1. Where large numbers of constituents take part in an
election process a danger arises if a single ballot
method is used of the person or persons being elected
by a minority of constituents.
2. Accordingly, a double ballot method should be used
as follows:
2.1 The first ballot shall be to nominate candidates
for election. Any constituent may nominate a candidate
if he can find a seconder.
2.2 The number of candidates standing for such election
shall be twice the number of vacant representative
roles to be filled if that number of candidates is
available.
2.3 If the number of candidates nominated in the
first ballot shall exceed the number required, then
those candidates receiving the highest number of
nominations shall stand. The number of candidates
shall be increased if necessary to include those tying
for the last places.
2.4 In the second ballot those candidates, up to the
number to be elected, receiving the highest number of
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votes shall be deemed elected.
2.5 In the event of a tie those tying shall take
part in a third ballot.
3. All ballots will be secret and will take place during
working hours. They will be conducted by existing
representatives or, if none exist in a constituency,
by a combination of representatives from other
constituencies and personnel officers.
4. Administrative assistance, nomination forms, voting
papers, ballot boxes etc. will be provided by
management on request.
5. Representative committees (subject to the agreement
of management which shall not be witheld unreasonably)
may invite officials of recognised unions to visit
the company's premises to scutinise the conditions
under which the elections are held.
6. Elected Representatives will assume office on the
first day of the month following the ballot and
will hold office for 12 months.
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CONSTITUTION OF COMMITTEES OF REPRESENTATIVES
1. The committee shall be known as
representative committee.
2. The functions of the committee are as follows:
2.1 To co-ordinate the work of those who are elected
by different constituencies either as representatives
of the same strata of employees or of employees who
are members of the same trade unions.
2.2 To decide the boundaries of constituencies and
methods of election of representatives.
2.3 To organise and scutinize the election of
representatives and to organise elections to fill
casual vacancies in constituencies.
2.4 To be accountable to employees generally for
ensuring that representatives carry out their duties
in a constitutional manner.
2.5 For co-ordinating the view of representatives in
order to protect their interests and be able to
provide management with a general picture of the
views of employees.
2.6 To act as a co-ordinated means of communication
with relevant trade union officers.
2.7 To elect from the members of their committee
persons to serve on the council.
2.8 To negotiate with management on matters affecting
the employees whom they represent and to refer to the
area council issues upon which agreement with management
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is not achieved.
3. The committee shall be composed of all duly elected
representatives from all the constituencies for which
the committee is accountable.
4. A majority of members of the committee shall constitute
a quorum of any ordinary committee meeting.
5. The chairman and secretary shall be elected by the
committee at its first meeting following the annual
election of representatives. They will serve as
committee members for 12 months subject to removal at
any time from office if a resolution to this effect
is supported by 75% of the members of the committee.
6. The committee may instruct their council representatives
upon the matters which they wish to have placed on
the council agenda.
7. The committee shall normally meet at least once each
month and at a time which enables them to consider
the agenda of the next council meeting.
8. Minutes of each committee meeting shall be kept by
the secretary, approved at the following meeting of
the committee and shall be available to all members
of constituencies coming within the ambit of the
committee.
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9. Proposals for amendment of this constitution shall be
published to members of all the committee's constituen-
cies at least 28 days before the committee meeting at
which they will be considered. Amendments shall be
dealt with at an extraordinary meeting of the committee
at which a quorum will be 75% of members of the
committee. Amendments to this constitution will
require the support of at least 75% of those attending
an extraordinary meeting of the committee.
10. When a committee is composed of representatives of
a stratum of employees which contains members of a
trade union or trade unions recognised by management,
then that committee shall contain within its membership
at least one representative who is a member of each
recognised trade union. Each committee will have
power to co-opt such trade union members in the event
that the body of duly elected representatives do not
contain such trade union members.
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COUNCIL CONSTITUTION
1. The Council shall be known as the
council.
2. Scope
The scope of discussions shall cover any reasonable
subject but no alteration of conditions controlled
by National Agreements between trade unions and
employers shall be made without reference to the
appropriate trade unions, except where members of
those trade unions on the council have been clearly
authorised by their respective trade unions to
enter into such agreements.
3. Authority of the Council
Every member of the council (including the management
member) shall have the right of veto over motions
before the council except the motions on procedure.
Each employee member of the council must be reasonably
confident before he gives an affirmative vote to a
resolution:
(a) that the broad concenus of opinion in the
constituencies and committee which he represents, will
accept the result as being at least tolerable, and
(b) that the result of passing the motion will not be
inconsistent with the policies of any trade union which
is recognised by the company and of which he is a member,
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In order to give an affirmative vote to a resolution
the management member of the council must be confident
that he will be able to implement the results effectively
and that the resolution is consistent with his terms of
reference from higher managerial authority from within
the company. In the case of a managing director of a
total company he will have, before voting affirmatively
on a council resolution, to be confident that the
outcome will be consistent with his terms of reference
from the board of directors and will not put at risk
the relation of the company to its customers nor be
inconsistent with contracts negotiated with them nor
be inconsistent with the law.
4. Functions
4.1 To decide the policies within which management
will have full authority to make decisions in operating
the organization.
4.2 To revise, clarify or change old policies.
4.3 To establish a written code of policies covering
all conditions of work.
4.4 To consider any matters placed on the council
agenda in due form by members of the council.
4.5 To receive from the management member at its
ordinary meetings a report on the affairs of the
organization including such matters as market demand,
forward load of work, organizational change, new plant
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or buildings, products, or new markets under consid-
eration, where such matters can,in the opinion of the
management member, be discussed without endangering
the competitive future of the company or infringing
the rights of shareholders.
4.6 To resolve disputes arising within the organization
concerning conditions of employees.
4.7 To negotiate and decide upon differential grades
and brackets of wages and salaries and other entitle-
ments as between all strata, departments and occupations
of employees.
4.8 To refer for discussion and negotiation between
management and representative committees or individual
representatives, matters raised before the council
which are not of sufficiently general concern to warrant
discussion by the council and which seem capable of re-
solution at lower levels of the organization.
5. Composition
The council shall consist of members all of
whom shall be employees of the company, as follows:
(a) The management member who shall be the chief
executive of the company or of the area, or his nominee.
(b) members of the representative committee
(c) members of the representative committee
(d) members of the representative committee
(e) members of the representative committee
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6. Quorum
A quorum of the council shall consist of the management
member or his nominee, a majority of the members
elected by each constituent committee of the council
who shall include among such members at least one
member of each trade union recognised by management.
7. Officers of the Council
7.1 Chairman. The chairman shall be elected by
the council from employees of the company at the first
meeting of the council following the annual election
of its members. To become duly elected the successful
nomination must have the support of a majority of
representative members of the council and of the
management member. The chairman shall not have power
to vote. If an elected member of the council be
elected as chairman he shall vacate his voting place
on the council and the appropriate committee shall
elect another member in his place.
In the event of the management member being elected
to the chair he shall retain his vote.
The chairman shall hold office for one year from the
date of his election, he shall be eligible for re-
election, he shall be an ex-officio member of the
council for four months after another chairman has
been elected in order to assist the new chairman with
his duties.
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7.2 Vice-Chairman. A vice-chairman shall be elected
by the council from among its members. He shall have
the power to vote and will take the chair in the
absence of the chairman.
7.3 Secretary. A secretary to the council and to
the council's steering committee shall be elected by
the same procedure as for the chairman. He shall
hold office for two years. He shall not be an elected
representative of any constituency during his term
of office as secretary.
The secretary will not be a member of the council but
shall attend every council meeting and meetings of the
council's steering committee.
When vacating office at the expiry of his term he
shall, unless council decides otherwise, make himself
available at council meetings, and otherwise to assist
the newly-elected secretary during the first two months
of his term of office.
7.4 Steering Committee. The steering committee of
the council shall consist of the chairman (who shall
have no vote) and one member of council drawn from
each of the constituent representative committees of
council and a nominee of the management member of
council.
The function of the steering committee shall be to
take such action on behalf of the council between
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meetings as shall be necessary. Decisions of the
steering committee shall be by majority vote of its
members but such decisions shall be subject to ratif-
ication by the council.*
The council, by resolution, may charge the steering
committee with accountability for carrying out studies
of situations, production of reports for council and
other such duties.
8. Procedure at Council Meetings
8.1 Voting. There shall be two types of voting
procedure:
(a) Unanimous voting which is required on policy
decisions. This creates the power of veto.
(b) Majority voting on matters of council procedure.
The power to decide when a matter is one of council
procedure shall be vested in the chairman who shall
rule before a vote is taken.
8.2 Any employee of the organization may attend as
an observer at ordinary meetings of the council when
they are held outside normal working hours. Those
attending in this way shall remain silent. They may
be evicted at the decision of the council chairman.
If, in the opinion of the chairman or the management
member of the council it would be detrimental to the
interests of the company for the business of the council
to be discussed in the presence of observers, such
* Experience has shown that most decisions of such a steering
committee are procedural rather than on matters of policy or
principle. 186
business shall be discussed in camera.
8.3 Defeated Motions. If a substantive motion is
defeated on a formal vote at the council meeting
further discussion shall not take place on that subject
until a subsequent meeting of the council.
8.4 Indicative Voting. The chairman shall have power
during discussion of a matter of policy to call for
indicative votes to test the opinion of the council
at any stage of the discussion.
9. Meetings
The council will normally meet once each calendar month
and at the close of each meeting shall decide upon the
date of its next meeting.
10. Extraordinary Meetings
The council chairman shall have power to convene and,
at the request of the management member, shall convene
a meeting of the council at any time.
11. Co-options to Council Meetings
11.1 The management member shall have power to co-opt
other managerial personnel for advisory purposes and
to expedite business.
11.2 Members of the council elected by any constituent
committee of council may co-opt for any specific item
one other employee of the company or an official of a
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trade union recognised by management.
11.3 Co-opted members shall not have power to vote.
12. Power to Amend Constitution of the Council
The council has power to amend the constitution, subject
to:
(a) the attendance of 75% of its members;
(b) the giving of notice of the proposed amendment
28 days before the meeting to the employees of the
organization and to the local officials of the recognised
trade unions;
(c) the resolution being subject to a unanimous vote.
13. Communication
The agenda and minutes of council meetings shall be
published without delay and be available to all
employees of the company.
Policies formally decided by council shall be assembled
suitably in loose-leaf books, copies of which will be
held by all elected representatives, and will be
available to employees in all departments and offices
of the organization.
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